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Labour Market Efficiency in the European
Union Employment Protection and Fixed Term Contracts Klaus Schömann, Ralf Rogowski and Thomas Kruppe |
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The deregulation of labour law in the European Union was thought to
be a spur to lasting growth of employment and an increase in labour
market efficiency. In particular, it was hoped that facilitating
fixed-term contracts would help many Europeans out of continued
unemployment and back into the workforce. Based on data from the
European Labour Force Survey, Labour Market Efficiency in the
European Union reveals that the results of such policies have been
far from those expected. This study provides a country by country
overview of the legal regulations concerning employment protection
and fixed-term employment in the twelve Member States of the
European Union (prior to its expansion in 1995). Employment patterns
of fixed-term employees are compared with those of employees in
standard employment relationships, with the analytical focus on
age-, gender- and industry specific patterns and assess the
probability of fixed-term employment within the European Union. They
offer hypotheses concerning the impact upon the labour market of
deregulation and of regulation. Drawing upon solid research and
rigorous analysis, this is a valuable discussion of how legal,
sociological and economic labour market theories contribute to an
understanding of atypical employment. Contents 1. Introduction 2. Legal and economic theories of labour market regulation 3. Employment protection systems and the regulation of fixed-term contracts in the European Union 4. Fixed-term employment patterns in the European Union 5. Multivariate analysis of country patterns 6. Fixed-term contracts and their relationship to macro-economic conditions 7. Conclusions Click to order...  ISBN/ISSN: 0-415-15734-X 224 Pages Price: US $75.00 Price: UK £50.00 |
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