Thomas R. Cusack
Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy
Does the partisan character of governing parties play a role in the formation of
fiscal policy? The conventional view is that the left tends toward excessive
deficits while the right practices a more prudent and restrictive fiscal policy.
However, there is little evidence that would sustain such a view. At the same
time, some strong arguments have been advanced which hold that whatever room
existed previously for partisanship in fiscal policy making has been sharply
reduced if not eliminated by developments such as greater international
financial interdependence in recent decades. These issues are examined with a
series of models that have been estimated using data from 14 OECD countries for
the period from 1961 through 1991. The evidence produced in this paper suggests
that the relationship between partisanship and fiscal policy is contingent on
macroeconomic conditions. The left has tended to treat fiscal policy as a
counter-cyclical tool, tightening fiscal policy when aggregate demand is high
and loosening it to stimulate the economy when demand is low. On the other hand,
the right has either refrained from such activism or actually conducted
procyclical fiscal policies. The evidence also suggests that these
partisan-based differences have been reduced over the recent decades.