

Social Structural Events and Class Voting

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


Figure 1: Possible effects of social structural events on party-preference

Do-File: *grtpaths.do*

and 1970ties¹ as well as network analyses (Laumann 1973; Eulau 1980). Finally also socialization theories draw from interaction theory to some extend.

In the third basic idea party preferences are generated by political socialization and remains stable afterwards (Campbell et al. 1954 1960; Dawson et al. 1977; Hyman 1959; Jennings and Niemi 1974). That is, if there is any link between social class and political preference it is due to the fact that people often has the same class position than their parents. This general idea is most prominent in the social psychological approach of the *Michigan School*. The core concept of this approach is the so called "party identification", which is regarded as a stable psychological membership to one party or another. Therefore I will use the term "identification theory" for this general idea.

How can we decide which of these explanations is true? All explanations conclude that there should be some correlation between social class and political preference. If

were the event starts some sort of a gradual development process.

In what follows I will argue that the three basic ideas will lead to different hypothe-

Assumption 3 (cleavage of power)

Employer: $\rho_{\text{cons,power}} > \rho_{\text{left,power}}$

We again can see this argument in terms of the SEU theory. In the Matrix \mathbf{P} given in equation (2) $p_{\text{cons,prosperity}}$ is the probability to achieve one unit of prosperity by voting for the conservatives, and $p_{\text{left,prosperity}}$ is the probability to achieve one unit of power

Social Structural Event		Expected Effect		
Origin	Destination	Origin	Destination	Sizes
Administrative Services	Self-employed	left	cons	weak
Experts/Others	Self-employed	left	cons	weak
Workers/Social Services	Self-employed	left	cons	strong
Self-employed	Administrative Services	cons	left	weak
Experts/Others	Administrative Services	-	-	-
Workers/Social Services	Administrative Services	left	cons	weak
Self-employed	Experts/Others	cons	left	weak
Administrative Services	Experts/Others	-	-	-
Workers/Social Services	Experts/Others	left	cons	weak
Self-employed	Workers/Social Services	cons	left	strong
Administrative Services	Workers/Social Services	cons	left	weak
Experts/Others	Workers/Social Services	cons	left	weak

Table 1: Expected Effects of social structural events

Hypothesis 2 (personal influence)
If ego

The other line of argument starts by stating that people always have the choice be-

Hypothesis 5 (stable party identification)

People do not change their political decisions after a social structural event.

One might argue that there is at least some difference in the utilities of the new and former decision—either because people tend to overestimate the weight of their votes or because there is some additional utility of “feeling to have made the right decision”. In this case we might want to look at the right hand side of equation (10) to make some hypotheses of the possibility of recalculating. Given that the calculation-

<i>i</i>	<i>t</i>	PI	Class
1	1	Lefties	Working Class
1	2	No PI	Self-employed
1	3	No PI	Self-employed
1	4	Conservatives	Self-employed

Table 4: Fictitious Respondent with Typical Pattern of PI

Mary for the first time

Birth of the first child

Birth of the second or other child

All event indicators are generated by using the logic described in section 3.2.

Event	absolute frequency			relative frequency		
	GSOEP	Lefty	Cons.	GSOEP	Lefty	Cons.
<i>Changover to Self-employed/Employer from ...</i>						




Figure 3: Fraction of persons with social structural events in the GSOEP vs. estimation samples

Do-File: *anpidlv2.do*

the figure the fraction of each event in the entire database is connected by a straight line with the fraction of the same event in the Lefties-model or the fraction of the same event in the conservatives-model respectively. If the hypotheses are true, we should expect increasing lines. In fact, most of the lines do increase. The exceptions are primarily due to the indicators for typical events in the life course. Hence, there is no reason to worry about the hypotheses from that point of view.

4.2 Immediate and Permanent Effects

Table 7 displays some overall statistics for the lefties- and the conservatives-model with immediate and permanent effects of social structural events. The goodness of fit of both models can be examined from the McFadden Pseudo- r^2 (p_{MF}^2), two variants of the *Bayesian Information Criterion* (BIC and BIC⁰)

Figure 4: Effects of the Crossover between Working Class/Social Services and Self-employed/Employer (Complete Information)

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


Figure 5: Effects of the Crossover between Working Class/Social Services and Self-employed/Employer (Incomplete Information)

Do-File: *grmod2a.do*

drawn for people with different political interests. The solid line without symbols represents the effect of the social structural events for those with lowest political interest. The line with plot-symbols represents the respondents with highest political interest.

Figure 6: Effects of Moving together with a Partner with other Party Identification than Oneself

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sectional model. Theoretically, it is expected, that a new left partner should pull the




Figure 7: Effects of the Crossover between Working Class/Social Services and Self-employed/Employer (Gradual Effects, Incomplete Information)

Do-File: *grmod3a.do*

with $\ln(\text{time points after event})$




Figure 8: Effects of Moving together with a Partner with other Party Identification than Oneself (Gradual Effects)

Do-File: *grmod3b.do*

Therefore let us take a look at the effects of interaction partners now.

Figure 8 shows the gradual effects of moving together with a new partner, who has another party identification than oneself. The upper part of the figure shows the effect of

versa didn't show the expected effects. Therefore, it has been concluded that the class voting could not be explained solely by the objective interests.

In the second step of the analysis the assumption of perfect information has been abandoned. Instead, it has been expected that the changeover from one class to another

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Event	Model-Type	
	Lefties	Cons.
Workers/Soc. Services	0.34	-0.16
	(1.50)	(-0.52)
<i>Changeover to Experts/Others from ...</i>		
Self-employed/Employer	1.08	-0.24
	(2.04)	(-0.62)
Admin. Services	-0.08	-0.03
	(-0.82)	(-0.15)
Workers/Soc. Services	-0.05	0.07
	(-0.57)	(0.45)
<i>Changeover to Workers/Social Services from ...</i>		
	(-0.82)	(-0.62)

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Event	Model-Type	
	Lefties	Cons.
	(-0.21)	(1.19)
<i>Changeover to Admin. Services from ...</i>		
Self-employed/Employer	-0.56	-0.38
	(-0.82)	(-0.63)
Political Interest	0.32	-0.12
	(1.08)	(-0.26)
Experts/Others	-0.34	0.02
	(-1.54)	(0.05)
Political Interest	0.23	-0.15
	(1.59)	(-1.03)
Workers/Soc. Services	0.48	-0.29
	(1.02)	(-0.53)
Political Interest	-0.12	0.07
	(-0.46)	(0.23)
<i>Changeover to Experts/Others from ...</i>		
Self-employed/Employer	1.26	-0.15
	(1.94)	(-0.30)
Political Interest	-0.15	-0.09
	(-0.39)	(-0.32)
Admin. Services	0.16	-0.32
	(0.70)	(-1.21)
Political Interest	-0.17	0.23
	(-1.23)	(1.75)
Workers/Soc. Services	0.09	-0.17
	(0.80)	(-1.06)
Political Interest	-0.14	0.18
	(-1.28)	(1.89)
<i>Changeover to Workers/Social Services from ...</i>		
Self-employed/Employer	-0.61	0.05
	(-1.30)	(0.08)
Political Interest	0.36	-0.19
	(1.65)	(-0.71)
Admin. Services	-0.16	0.46

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Event	Model-Type	
	Lefties	Cons.

Continuation from previous page

Event	Model-Type	
	Lefties	Cons.
	(-0.22)	(0.13)
Political Interest	0.01	-0.05
	(0.11)	(-0.24)
Mary First Time	0.07	0.02
	(0.90)	(0.19)
Political Interest	-0.01	-0.01
	(-0.12)	(-0.19)
Birth First Child	0.13	0.05
	(1.34)	(0.43)
Political Interest	-0.04	-0.02
	(-0.45)	(-0.40)
Birth Other Childs	-0.10	-0.04
	(-0.94)	(-0.47)
Political Interest	0.04	-0.04
	(0.52)	(-0.54)
<i>New Partner with other PI than Ego</i>		

P. Balestra. Fixed effect models and fixed coefficient models. In L. Mátyás and P. Sevestre, editors, *The Econometrics of Panel Data. Handbook of Theory and Applications*

N. D. De Graaf and B. Steijn. The service class in a post-industrial society. attitudes and

R. Schnell and U. Kohler. Empirische untersuchung einer individualisierungshypothese am beispiel der parteipräferenz von 1953-1992.