

Systems of Economic Interest Groups and Socio-Economic Performance

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1. Introduction

Interest organizations, namely the economic ones, have gained more and more attention during the late 70s and the 80s. This development is by no means accidental but related to changes in the economic and political systems. The increasing interpenetration of the political and economic sphere (Habermas 1981; Luhmann 1985; Münch 1982) has led to stronger interdependencies and influences. Schmitter even argued that the key to the understanding of the different forms of crisis of governability is the direct contact of the arena of functional interest representation with the bureaucracy of the modern state (Schmitter 1979:108). Lehmbruch sees an interpenetration of liberal corporatism and the party system (Lehmbruch 1977:120). Empirical studies into policy networks show the strong involvement of business organizations as well as labour unions in many policy areas, especially in labour and economic policies (Laumann, Heinz, Nelson, Salisbury 1991; Pappi, König, Stadler 1989). The increasing interpenetration of economic and political systems finds its theoretical expression in a changing view on interest organizations. Whereas until the late seventies a pluralist view on interest organizations was the major perspective, neo-, functional, and liberal corporatism was the dominant paradigm later on. The major change in perspective was from pressure politics to intermediation. The research perspective switched from the question about the influence of interest groups on politics to the question of push and pull between the state and interest groups. Interest groups and especially unions and employers' organizations were seen as embedded in a tripartite relationship with the state. Thus, the view changed from the power perspective to the perspective of regulative capacities of interest groups supporting macro-political goals of the government.

Research in this lines made it common knowledge that corporatism matters for economic performance. However, corporatism was mainly defined either by experts, rating the countries they are most familiar with (cf. Lehmbruch 1982) or by empirical information about the union systems. Some authors, for example, use a combination of central characteristics of unions' systems as a substitute measure for corporatism (cf. Golden 1993). This is, to a certain extent, a shortcoming of research. Taking into consideration two

parties of a tripartite arrangement only - i.e. the state and the unions - might produce misleading results. The Japanese case is a good example: weak unions but high institutional integration, or concordance, in Lehner's term (Lehner 1987). Others went further and looked at the characteristics of both societal parties of corporatism. Crouch (1985:116) and Soskice (1990:17) paid attention as to which degree coordination exists between employers and between unions. One might argue that only the view on the complementarities in structures between employers' organizations and unions can provide sufficient information about the degree of corporatism within a system.

But research into the structure and effects of business associations seems to be a neglected or at least not a well-developed area. If not in theory so at least in empirical research. The few attempts to set structures of business and labour organizations into relation are limited mainly to bargaining structures and cannot really fill the gap. Although there are numerous country-specific studies on the organization of business the number is small compared to publications about unions, political parties, parliaments, governments, and other intermediating institutions. This is especially true when it comes to comparative research. Jackson and Sisson wrote in 1976 that little attention had been paid to the role of employers and their organizations. Schmitter and Streeck added to this in 1981 in their research design on the comparative study of associative action of business saying that "reliable information, much less analysis, on the resources, organizational characteristics, attitudes, activities and strategies of formal associations specialized in the promotion and protection of trade and/or employer interest is rare" (1981:1f.). Now, 15 years later, the situation is a little better. At least some comparative literature can be found. The greatest advance of comparative research on recent organized business is the volume of country studies edited by Windmuller and Gladstone (Windmuller, Gladstone 1984). Some other smaller works have been published in the meantime. There is a volume on the politicization of business in Western Europe (van Schendelen, Jackson 1987) and some comparative articles on European business (for example Coleman, Grant 1988; Lanzalaco 1992). The by far most important work with respect to the comparative view on the development of organized business from the 19th century until today is Crouch's book on industrial relations (Crouch 1993). His study underlines the relevance of the structural development of business associations for the structural development of trade unions, industrial relations, and general exchange modi like corporatism (Crouch 1993:334ff). However, most of these researches are not macro-empirically orientated and all of them missed what is being done frequently in the field of labour unions: to empirically relate structures of business organizations to economic or political performance.

For unions, to the contrary, macro-empirical studies can fill a whole library. Unions can be indisputably regarded as organizations with a major impact on the performance of the

economy, the performance of the political system and also as important for the performance and outlook of societies and their social life as a whole. That is not to say they have a positive or negative impact on better performance. Whether they hamper or promote growth and efficiency, obstruct productivity more than advance it is an ongoing discussion (Visser 1990, ch. 1). What is not neglected is that unions and their structures do matter in many respects. Several authors have pointed to the fact that structures of interest organizations and representation add a "second circuit" to the "machinery of the democratic representative polity" (Offe 1981: 141). Lange and Meadwell (1991: 95) argue that "some systemic outcomes are better explained by institutional arrangements in the corporatist circuit than by arrangements in the parties-cabinet-legislature nexus". The vast empirical literature on unions and - especially economic - performance support the relevance of unions.

For example, Cameron (1984) found a strong relationship between the organizational power of labour and the control of government by leftist party, a fact undoubtedly influencing political performance. Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991) have found that the interplay between unions and political parties is of direct relevance to macroeconomic performance, which points to the dimension of politically influenced economic performance, and the problem of an "integrative" policy. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) report a relation between centralization of unions and macroeconomic performance, Lange and Garret (1985), Hicks (1988), and others show that the organizational strength of labour unions is a source of long-term growth insofar as it is complemented by a strong left party in government. The influence of interest politics and their structures on income and adjustment policies has been singled out by Marks (1986), Czada (1987), and others. Golden (forthcoming) and Wallerstein (1990) point to the fact that union structures directly affect the social order; they have an effect on whether conflict and militancy is chosen as a strategy to pursue labour interests. These empirical findings tell a story which supports the view that unions and union systems are of great importance to the political system and political processes. As Lindblom (1949) puts it: you can't avoid unions altogether; you can't without destroying democracy. And, to add: you can't without losing understanding of the working of political systems.

That is why there is no lack of literature on trade unions as organizational forms, purposive associations and even not on their impact on political and economic performance. But nevertheless is it still true that most studies are not inclined to typologies that are able to withstand comparative analysis. This complain made by von Beyme in 1980 (von Beyme 1980a: 1) is supported in a recent book by Martin who stated that the outcome of research on trade unionism is a very large and expanding literature, even if one takes into consideration the English language publications alone, but it is deficient in a crucial

aspects: "It lacks a practicable scheme by which the institutional forms of trade unionism may be ordered and categorized on a transnational basis." (Martin 1989: 103).

Here, an attempt will be made to order systems of business associations and union systems with respect to their most important organizational characteristics. In a second step it will be investigated as to which degree the structures of both sub-systems show a complementarity in functional terms, which is regarded as one of the prerequisites of encompassing or corporatist policy-making. Thirdly, it will be asked whether these system characteristics matter for policy performance (outputs) and outcomes with respect to two central arenas of corporatist policy-making: income and employment.

2. Economic Interest Organizations and their Structure

2.1. Data and Strategy

Investigating and defining structures of interest organization systems can take at least two shapes. The first is to try to identify structural characteristics of the system as a whole, that is structures which are not dependent on the structures of the elements of a system. In analogy to the political system this could be the legal framework in which economic interest groups act. It is a kind of looking into meta-structures with respect to the elements of the system. The second form is to identify structural characteristics of the elements of a system and to build, from here, the structure of the system. The second one is the strategy chosen here. The meta-structural approach is quite limited in scope since most characteristics of systems stem from the internal structure of its elements and the resulting relations between elements of the organizational system and other subsystems. In analogy to party systems one might argue that the more important structural characteristics stem from the relation between elements of a system. For example, fractionalization or polarization characterize the relation between the particular parties, although often used as a system element. Or, to get closer to economic interest groups, corporatism is by no means a structural characteristic independent of the particular elements, although it often appears to be. It is a system characteristic originating from the particular relations between a subset of elements of the system and an actor of a different subsystem, i.e. the relation between unions, employer, and the state.

Choosing the strategy to characterize the system of economic interest groups by the characteristics of the particular organization poses the problem of the selection of organizations. For analytical and practical reasons the investigation is limited here to either

important national peak organizations of federations or to *important organizations at the national level* not belonging to any federation. The practical reason is just an argument of numbers. Counting only the member organisations and associations of the peak organizations selected here, they would amount to more than 10.000 organizations in the OECD countries.

The question of importance relates to the analytical argument and also has a practical side-effect of reducing the number of organizations to investigate. Only important organizations might have an impact on the performance of political systems, be it direct or indirect as unfolded in the last section. The criterion for importance is a simple one. Only those organizations have been taken into consideration which in the literature are said to be important or influential either in the system of economic interest groups or with respect to the political system. Information about the organization has been sampled from comparative and country studies as well as from different compendiums (see bibliography). Information has been recorded in a systematic way asking for the type of the organization, its genesis, its functions, form, structure, ideology and partisan orientation if any, its size, political influence and bargain power.

2.2. Business Associations

The universe are all business organizations of the mentioned type. There is no pre-selection between employers' organisations and trade associations. Although in analytical terms these types of organizations are very distinct they are not so in the empirical world. Analytically, business associations together with unions can be placed in a two-dimensional space separating capital and labour in the one dimension and class interests vs. producer interests in the other (Streeck 1989:24ff). Thus, we find unions and employers' organizations dealing with class interests of labour and, respectively, capital, and trade associations dealing with producer interests. Empirically, separate employers' organizations performing only this particular function are rare. Hence, at least trade associations also representing employers' interests have to be taken into consideration. Moreover it can be argued that the organization of trade associations itself is also of relevance for the configuration of business interests as a whole. On the one hand, in most of the countries close relations exist between trade associations and, where existing, functionally specialized employers' organizations. Strategies and policies are not independent of each other. A second point is that the structural characteristics of the trade association system gives itself important information about the unity and diversity of business interests, thus relating to the

important dimension of power in steering the subsystem as well as demanding against the political system.

Due to the limited information given in the literature, especially the comparative one, and owing to the limits of information processing, most recorded structural characteristics are valid for the mid- and late eighties. In other words, it is an empirical snapshot on structures. Although there is no doubt that this limits analytical possibilities, it is not so serious a shortcoming as one might suspect at first glance. A closer look at the development of business organization systems reveals a quite high degree of stability of important structural characteristics over time (see Crouch 1993; Wessels 1994).

Variables characterizing the system of business organizations recorded and reported here include:

- differentiation of associations for small business
- regional differentiation of associations
- associational differentiation
- political influence
- bargain power
- power of employers' associations
- scope of employers' associations
- pushfulness of employers' associations.

2.2.1. The Diversity of Business Associations in the OECD


As mentioned above, the elements of analysis from which characteristics of the business organizations subsystem will be derived are the important peak confederations and national organizations in the OECD. These organizations fall into three different groups: those dealing with class interest, i.e. functionally specialized employers' organizations; those dealing both with the function of trade associations and employers' organizations; and third, those being trade associations or political think tanks of business not involved in wage bargaining at all (Streeck 1989). Altogether 82 business organizations have been identified as important in 24 OECD-countries. There are functionally specialized employers' organizations in twelve countries, while in the other twelve countries business organizations perform both the function of a trade association and an employers' organization. All in all there are 15 important pure employers' organizations, 24 mixed organizations and 43 trade associations and think tanks of business, and the like, which are important but not involved in wage bargaining.

These 82 business organizations show a high degree of heterogeneity in central structural characteristics. First of all they all cover quite different degrees of internal sectoral differentiation and internal regional differentiation. The number of sectoral units, be it sectoral member organizations of a peak federation or sectoral units of the peak organization itself, vary between 6 and about 500. The regional differentiation, i.e. the number of regional units - either member organizations or the regional differentiation of the organization itself - varies even more. The number ranges from four in Ireland to 3000 in France. For those business associations which are differentiated sectorally and regionally quite a relationship exists between both dimensions of differentiation ($R^2 .30$, $n = 18$). The general tendency is that the higher the sectoral differentiation, the higher is the regional differentiation.

Because sectoral and regional differentiation is often constituted by membership associations, there is quite a covariation between both types of differentiation and the number of member associations in peak federations. The largest number can be found for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (4000), the smallest in the United States as well (National Association of Public and Private Employer Negotiators and Administrators, 3).

When it comes to firms as direct or indirect members via member associations of business organizations the picture is as heterogenous as with the other characteristics. From 300 to 1.7 million direct and indirect members all sizes can be found.

Figure 1



When it comes to types of associations, i.e. specialized employer or trade associations and those performing both, typical differences exist, on average. Given the enormous diversity of organizational characteristics between organizations of the same type in one country and above all between countries, the following results can only carefully be generalized. Trade associations show, on average, the highest means on sectoral and regional differentiation and, connected with it, in member associations. But they have not the highest membership figures. The highest membership figures are shown by business organizations which perform both the function of market and class interest. Specialized employers' associations show the lowest degree of regional differentiation and a medium position in sectoral differentiation. Related to this their member association figures are, on average, much smaller than the ones for the other two types of business organizations (figure 1).

The results show that business is by no means unitary or homogenously organized. Just the opposite is true. The picture thus arising confirms very much the findings of Streeck and gives raise to the question how complexity and diversity translates into capacity and effectiveness (Streeck 1989:24f.). This question is especially relevant in view of the impact of business organizations on the performance of political systems, be it the direct or the indirect impact. To address this question a switch in the analytical perspective from the level of the single organizations to the level of the business organization system as a whole seems to be appropriate. It is also necessary to add a theoretical perspective to the descriptive one in order to facilitate the identification of those structural characteristics of business organizations systems which are relevant for political performance.

2.2.2. The Structural Characteristics of Business Organization Systems in the OECD

Structural characteristics of business organization *systems* must refer to the relationships between the set of (important) business organizations or the relationship to other (organizational) subsystems within a nation. Some of the structural dimensions are very much the same as for the view on a single organization. Differentiation, for example, applies as a concept to both levels of analysis. Other dimensions like segmentation and contestation apply only to the system level but depend on the information of the set of individual organizations. A review of the literature on business organization reveals a high degree of communality in the determination of important structural dimensions. Lanzaloco uses two dimensions to classify business organizations in Western Europe: segmentation and functional differentiation. Segmented systems "are characterized by the presence of two or more cleavages which crosscut one another and bring about a number of different


peak associations." (Lanzalaco 1992:193). The second type of differentiation is of a functional nature, i.e. the differentiation of employers' and trade association and sectoral differentiation. Coleman and Grant even identify two very similar dimension which - as they prove - are of relevance for the associational involvement in the policy process. The first dimension is differentiation, which meets the segmentation dimension of Lanzalaco quite closely. The dimension asks for the differentiation of roles between organizations of a system. They distinguish three roles: representation of socio-political interests (employer function), the representation of political economic interests (sectoral interests), and the representation of territorially defined interests (Coleman, Grant 1988:473). The second dimension is contestation, i.e. the existence of competition between organizations performing the same role. Windmuller makes the same distinctions with respect to segmentation or differentiation, although he defines them as separate dimensions of a structure. The first dimension defined by him is the functional differentiation. It separates trade associations from employers' organizations. The second is the dimension of economic activity. It refers to differentiation according to industry. The third dimension is regionalization (Windmuller 1984:7ff.). In addition to these dimensions he also defines ownership and size of a firm as important structural characteristics of business interest group systems. Ownership refers to the existence of separate organizations for publicly-owned industrial firms (most relevant in Italy), and size of firm to the existence of separate organizations for small and medium-sized firms.

Although using different terms, Lanzaloca, Coleman and Grant, and Windmuller have very much the same in mind. There are some differences in the interpretation of the meaning of different types of differentiation. But their general arguments can be usefully translated into two dimensions of differentiation, i.e. functional and interest differentiation. Functional covers sectoral differentiation and the organizational separation of employers' and trade functions. Interest differentiation refers to the existence of organizations especially for small and medium-sized business as well as to the existence of organizations representing regional interests.

In addition to these, two further dimensions of crucial importance especially with respect to their impact on performance are defined by Windmuller and Gladstone. Windmuller adds the dimension of authority and discipline in a business organization system. It relates to the question of which organizations can uphold the internal solidarity of business interests and oblige members to the commitments of the organization (Windmuller 1984:19f.). Gladstone adds a dimension that might be called political influence or power of business organizations. It represents the relations with the state, be it the pressure potential or consultation (Gladstone 1984:26f.).

Turning to the first dimension - i.e. functional differentiation of business organization systems - sectoral differentiation and the differentiation of organizations with the specialized function of representing employers' interest within the system are under investigation. In contrast to the differentiation of the organizational subsystem in employers' and trade associations, differentiation according to industry or branch is measured by the internal differentiation of the organizations. Because the differentiation of organizations into sectoral units varies with the scale of economy, figures have been standardized by scale of economy, i.e. the size of the GNP. A look at the pattern of functional differentiation clearly shows that Austria, Japan, and Germany rank highest with respect to both dimensions, while Australia, Luxembourg and Switzerland rank lowest (figure 2). Concerning sectors, Great Britain shows by far the highest differentiation. As expected, there is no relationship between sectoral differentiation and the organizational differentiation of employers' interests (table 1).

Figure 2:



Interest differentiation of business organization systems show a different picture. New Zealand is most fragmented in regional terms, Japan in terms of segmentation between large and small business (figure 2). There is a weak positive relationship between both dimensions of differentiation as well. It is not easy to make a general statement on which division is a greater challenge to business solidarity. This might depend on national and cultural conditions. Assuming that both dimensions have the same weight, New Zealand is most highly segmented, followed by Japan and France. The most cohesive business in terms of interest organization can be found in the United States, Germany, and possibly the Netherlands.

Interestingly enough, this pattern only re-appears in parts when it comes to co-ordination power. Co-ordination power can be regarded as the most important mean of business

organizations to hold up solidarity and coherence between interests. One would thus expect a close relationship to segmentation or differentiation of interests. This assumption fits with respect to Germany and the Netherlands: Both rank at the top of co-ordination power (table 1).

Table 1: Structural Characteristics of Business Organization Systems in the OECD

Country	Differentiation					Scope, Power, Influence				
	Sectoral	Employers Function	Regional	Small Business	Associational (No)	Political Influence	Co-Ordination Power	Push-fullness	Scope	Power
AL	0.06	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.67	0.62	-	-	-
AU	0.45	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.87	0.82	1	0.86
BE	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	-	1.00	0.75	0.82	1	0.86
CA	-	0.83	0.67	0.50	-	0.33	0.00	-	-	-
DE	0.01	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	-	-	0.64	1	0.71
FI	0.01	1.00	0.50	0.75	0.03	-	0.69	0.64	0.83	0.86
FR	0.17	0.69	0.62	0.92	0.05	-	0.25	0	0.67	0.43
GB	1.00	0.86	0.57	0.43	0.1	1.00	0.00	0.18	0.5	0.71
GE	0.26	0.85	0.31	0.69	0.12	1.00	0.87	0.64	0.83	0.86
GR	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
IC	0.00	1.00	0.80	0.60	0	1.00	0.50	-	-	-
IR	0.01	1.00	0.67	0.50	0.06	1.00	-	0.05	0.5	0.57
IT	0.14	0.63	0.50	0.75	0.36	0.00	0.75	0.18	0.67	0.57
JA	0.31	1.00	0.67	1.00	0.62	0.47	0.50	-	-	-
LU	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.11	-	0.62	-	-	-
NE	-	0.25	0.00	0.75	0.2	1.00	1.00	1	1	1
NO	0.02	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	-	0.87	0.64	0.83	0.86
NZ	-	0.75	1.00	0.75	0.13	-	0.62	-	-	-
PO	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.1	-	-	-	0	0
SP	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.3	-	-	-	0.67	0.29
SW	0.09	1.00	0.50	0.38	0.07	0.17	0.87	0.64	0.83	0.86
SZ	0.01	0.67	0.67	0.50	0.05	1.00	0.87	0.82	1	0.86
TU	0.13	1.00	0.00	0.00	1	-	0.75	-	-	-
US	0.08	0.88	0.24	0.53	0.26	0.29	-	-	-	-

- no data available.

Differentiation: Information from own data collections. Basic information for the scales are the numbers of specific associations respectively associational sectors, standardized to scale of the economy. These numbers have been standardized to scales with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 1.

Scope, Power, Influence: Political influence and co-ordination power is coded from information from a wide range of literature on business and employers' associations (see references). Scope and power is scaled information available in Crouch 1993, pushfullness the product of both. Again, all informations have been standardized to scales running from zero to one.

But other business interest systems with a quite high segmentation must also be regarded as powerful with respect to co-ordination. However, problems of missing data make it impossible to produce a clear result concerning the relationship between segmentation and co-ordination power. Business organization systems also vary according to their political power, i.e. their access and influence on politics as it is recorded in the research literature. There is a group of seven European business interest systems which show quite the same high capacity of political influence. These are Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (table 1). For the rest of the organizational systems quite a variance can be observed. But, as can be seen, political power and co-ordination power do not really covariate. This result is not unpalatable if one undertakes the following consideration. Single business organizations might have quite an easy access to the political system and pressure potential without having a high capacity to control their member units or to co-ordinate between organizations.

On the other hand, one would expect that if organizations have the capacity to co-ordinate they should also have quite an easy access to the political system. Again the problem of missing data occurs. Data for political power are not available yet for Austria and all Scandinavian systems except Sweden. Thus, the relation between co-ordination power and political power is still open to research. Having dealt with the theoretically most meaningful dimensions of business organization system structures we can now turn to the task of typologising these systems.

2.2.3. A Typology of Business Organization Systems

Theoretically and empirically, differentiation and power are the two general dimensions which seem to be most appropriate to be used for an typological attempt. Consequently, the best way would be to assess the problem by asking for the dimensionality of the four specific dimensions, i.e. functional differentiation, interest differentiation, co-ordination power, and political power. This would methodologically be very much in line with the way the problem was addressed regarding unions (Wessels 1993). And, even more important, it is meaningful in a theoretical sense as well. For the union systems the same general dimensions have been proved to be most useful to a typology, i.e. union effectiveness, which relates to power, and divisions in the union system, which relates to differentiation.

Unfortunately, this strategy can be followed only partly. This is due to the fact that data are missing. Information on all variables is available for a number of ten cases only (AU, FI, FR, GB, GE, IT, NE, NO, SW, SZ). In addition to co-ordination power and political

influence, three variables derived from Crouch (1993), i.e. power, scope, and pushfulness, have been included in analysis to cover the power dimension. A factor analysis (principle component, unrotated) of this very small dataset identified as expected two factors. The first represents the power-related variables and explains 55 percent of the variance. The second represents the dimension of (interest) differentiation and explains 25 percent of the variance (table 2).

Using the factor scores, the business interest systems of these ten countries can be typologized against the two dimensions. Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland belong to the group of systems with high power and low differentiation; Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands to the group of countries with high power and high differentiation. Italy represents the case of a system with high differentiation and low power, France and Great Britain systems with low power and low differentiation.

Table 2: Factor Analysis of Characteristics of Business Organization Systems

	Factor 1 (Power)	Factor 2 (Interest Differentiation)
Differentiation for small business	-.45	.58
Regional differentiation	.06	.92
Associational differentiation	-.18	.83
Co-ordination power	.86	.31
Political influence	.91	.14
Pushfulness of employers' associations	.98	-.01
Scope of employers' associations	.89	-.06
Power of employers' associations	.94	.02
Reduction of variance	55.1	25.3


Principal-components analysis, varimax rotation, Kaiser normalization.

To typologize more of the countries, a strategy has been used to determine mean scores for each country with the incomplete empirical information. The technical procedure was to weigh the existing empirical information with the factor loadings and to calculate a mean score on the basis of the number of variables for which information was available. With this method it was possible to increase the number of business organizations systems to 23.

Owing to this result systems can be classified into nine groups, making the distinction between low, medium, and high power and interest differentiation. Only seven out of these nine theoretically possible groups appear empirically. Given the change of the relative position of countries of the prior analysis, Italy is not any longer the country with the

highest degree of differentiation and the lowest degree of power. In fact, the cells with high and medium differentiation and low power are empirically not represented any longer in the comparison of 23 instead of ten countries. Nearly all the Scandinavian countries along with Austria and Switzerland represent high power and low differentiation. Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands have business organizations systems with high power and medium differentiation. Turkey represents a system with high power and high differentiation. Lowest power and lowest differentiation can be found in Canada, France, and Portugal. Further ten countries show medium power and varying degrees of differentiation (see figure 3).

Figure 3



The results demonstrate that there is a great variety of business organization systems between countries. Related to this the results also indicate that these two dimensions are indeed the ones which have the power to separate systems. This fact as such seems to show

at least some validity of the results. A cross-check with the literature does not reveal any contradictions at the first glance either.

2.3. Unions and Union Systems

Many different indicators have been utilized in a number of comparative studies on unions and union systems. The most often used concepts are centralization (Alvarez/Garrett/Lange 1991; Armingeon 1987; Blyth 1979; Calmfors/Driffill 1988; Cameron 1984; Czada 1987; Schmitter 1981), union power (Garrett/Lange 1986; Cameron 1984), bargaining coordination (Crouch 1985; Cameron 1984; Calmfors/Driffill 1988; Soskice 1990) and corporatism (Bruno/Sachs 1985; Schmitter 1981; Lehner 1987; McCallum (1986) and many others: see Lijphart/Crepaz 1991). These concepts are all related to the central dimensions of the sociology of organizations. Centralization is as Hage (1965) has shown, an appropriate translation of Max Weber's concept of hierarchy of authority into a general variable. Research with this general variable has often followed the Hage axiomatic hypothesis 'the greater the centralization, the greater the efficiency' by relating centralization to performance. Power is also a central variable of organization theory, intra-organizational as well as inter-organizational (Clegg/Dunkerley 1980: 453-457, 483-555). The same is true for coordination as a means to create loyalty (Hage 1980: 350ff.). Corporatism is frequently used as a measure of the possibilities of unions to influence (economic) performance and of the integration of unions in the policy process.

Although the concepts could be related to quite well-developed theoretical arguments, for example those of the organization theory (Hage 1980), in fact only minor use has been made of theoretical considerations in the empirical work with the concepts. Mainly some more or less self-evident hypotheses about the relationship between features of unions and of (economic) performance are tested. Maybe this is the reason why typologies are hard to come by in the literature. A typology, in a strict sense, is a multidimensional classification (Blau/Scott 1962: 41), with the dominant analytical tools being classifications. The available typologies of union systems are in fact more than typologies of union systems. They bear, as the concepts of corporatism and bargaining coordination, the problem of dealing with relational structures between different collective actors or systems. Those typologies relate variables of union characteristics to characteristics of the party system (Martin 1989), to the success of left parties (Lange/Meadwell 1991), and to political culture (von Beyme 1980b). In our opinion, a typology of union systems has to deal with variables of the union system alone. If it turns out that such a typology relates to the characteristics of structures of different organization systems like the business organizations or political

parties, one might then think of "higher order structures" or the structures of structures (Easton 1990: 260ff.).

Thus, variables and concepts for developing a typology of union systems are chosen here which are at least no relational variables. Although it is not assumed that they are independent from the environment of trade unions, they stand alone without any further information about structures, involvement etc. of other actors and systems but unions.

Here, 12 variables will be used to characterize union systems:

- union densities;
- "volatility" of union membership in regard to potential and actual members;
- union system stability, a variable combining change in fractionalization and volatility;
- mean union density 1970-88;
- union fractionalization, end of the seventies/beginning of the eighties;
- (party-) political split in union systems;
- religious split;
- occupational split;
- legal regulation of labour relations;
- level of bargaining;
- centralization of unions;
- union power.

Some of these variables have been created just for this chapter (fractionalization; volatility in union membership; union system stability, splits in union systems, as they are measured here), using different sources. Others have been taken over from other researches (densities; legal regulation; level of bargaining). Centralization in unions and union power, to mention the last two, are synthetical variables using several variables or indicators of other authors by combining them in one score. They are probably more reliable than each of them alone.

How do these variables relate to theoretical assumptions and what is their importance for the character of union systems? There are at least two theoretically meaningful blocks in which the variables and what they stand for can be placed.

Integration: Integration can be looked at in at least two ways with respect to organizations: the social dimension of integration and the resource dimension of union systems. Here, integration refers to the social aspect of associations. That is, corporate organizations integrate and mediate relationships between the individual and the (organized) environments (Knoke 1990: 8-12), i.e. the political system, the business interests and others. The question is to what extent in terms of quantity and quality the union systems could serve this purpose. Quantity of integration is related to the union density. That is the share of the unionized active labour force in a society. Quality points to

the question to what extent those mediation processes are unitary or not. This relates to the variables dealing with the political, religious, and occupational splits as well as with the overall measurement of divisions, the fractionalization.

Power: The variables that describe the internal structure of unions directly refer to the question of organizational power. The most prominent view of organization theory to power deals with the question of internal power and authority. Obviously, the variables employed here can be used to qualify whether union leaders are able to enforce compliance (Etzioni 1975) for example with respect to bargaining results. But they can be turned in the opposite direction, too: the power of unions and their leaders not being directed toward their members, but toward the political and economic system. There are some propositions or hypotheses of the organization theory (Hage 1965) and the political economy of associations (Clegg/Dunkerley 1980: 483-555; Knoke 1990: 47-65) which support this view. Centralization, the level of bargaining, and union power relate to these propositions directly. Centralization and the level at which binding bargaining decisions will be taken (i.e. the peak organization, the sectoral unions, the plant level) are closely related. They fit the hypothesis 'the higher the centralization, the better the performance' (Hage 1965). The variable of union power in most of the cases combines the resource aspect and the aspect of organizational structure. That is, it combines unionization or densities with centralization and unity. The third variable, grouped into this block, is the degree of legal regulation of labour relations. It is, in fact, a measurement of legal regulation of unions' rights and privileges, i.e. whether they have a formally guaranteed say in bargaining; which of their possible sanctions are legally regulated (strike, for example); which scope of collective agreement is guaranteed by the state; and to which extent unions are legally involved in co-determination at the plant or firm level. It is quite obvious that these regulations are directly related to the question of union power.

2.3.1. Variety of Union Systems

Integration

The first block of variables deals with the question of integration and unity. The quantitative aspect of integration, the unionization is measured for the purpose of the typology as a mean union density at five time points between 1970 and 1988 (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1988). The source is an OECD publication (Visser 1991). The variety of unionization across countries can be seen in figure 4, chart 1. For union system fractionalization no single source could be exploited. For twelve European countries the results presented for the year 1985 have been used. For the other twelve countries the time


point varies between 1978 (Canada) and 1988. For these union systems calculation was based on country study information, most of them available in Mielke (1982). In some countries (Canada, Japan, Luxembourg, and New Zealand) a remarkable portion of union members could not be located within the union federations on which information was available. They have been placed in a residual category and they count like one union in the calculation of fractionalization. That might over- or underestimate the real fractionalization. But deviation from reality is at least lower using this procedure as neglecting this group of union members. Fractionalization scores are presented in figure 4, chart 2.

Concerning the political, religious, and occupational splits a somewhat different approach is used, compared to other researches. Splits are often characterized by dichotomous variables: major split exists/does not exist. If the variation of the importance and the degree of splits between countries should be taken into consideration, such an approach falls short. Therefore, intuitive plausible measures of the importance of the split for the union system as a whole are used.

The political split in union systems is measured as a percentage of affected union members of all union members. In general, it is the split between communist and socialist unions, with the exception of Belgium. Here, it is a socialist-liberal split. The percentage is the sum of the portion of union members joining the political opponents. For example, the French communist union CGT assembles 30.6 percent of all union members, the socialist FO 24.3 percent. Thus, the score for the (party-) political split of the French union system is 54.9. Portugal and Spain show the deepest political splits. Communist and socialist unions absorb (nearly) all union members. Remarkably less, but still important are the political splits in Italy, France, Japan, and Belgium. Taking all together, only 6 of 24 union systems show major political splits (figure 4, chart 3).

The religious split in union systems is measured in a somewhat different way. In this case it makes no sense to follow the same strategy as for the political split, because then the score would always add to 100: The religious and the secularized unions, i.e. all unions, are affected by a religious split or by opponents. Therefore, the representational strength of religious union is here taken as a measure of the religious split. Religious splits occur in seven of the 24 OECD countries: it is quite important in Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, less important in Switzerland and of minor importance (representational strength under 5 percent) in France, Germany, and Canada (figure 4, chart 4).

Figure 4: Integrative Strength and Divisions in Union Systems



Occupational splits exist in more union systems than do political or religious splits. The score is calculated in the same way as for the religious split. It measures the share of the total union membership in occupational unions. In some of the countries this includes a white-collar division between unions (Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland). In the other countries it is a functional differentiation of the union system in different occupational or sectoral unions (professionals, technicians, public servants, industry sectors, etc.). The occupational split is highest in Sweden (39.5) with its strong white collar

union TCO (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) and the quite strong union for professionals and civil servants (SACO-SR, Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation). Finland follows with 33.8 percent union members in occupational unions, and then Iceland. In eleven of the 24 countries occupational splits are of major importance (figure 4, chart 5).

Power

Four variables are used as indicators for the political power of union systems. Two of them have been taken just as they appear in the literature. The first one is the legal regulation of labour relations, the other the level of bargaining in union systems.

The index of legal regulation was developed by Armingeon (1992) in a very serious research project on the development of labour relations in 21 OECD countries. It starts with the earliest laws on the right to form a coalition and documents legal development in these countries until 1990. It focuses on four types of regulation and for each of the four an index was created which ranges from one to four. The values for these four indices have been summed up to a summary score with a range from 4 to 16. The first type is concerned with laws and regulations about the organization of labour unions. A value of "1" indicates that independent unions are forbidden, "2" that they are allowed but that there is no security of being recognized by the bargaining opponent. "3" indicates that independent unions are allowed and recognized, and added to this, "4" says that legal regulations further the centralization of trade unions. The second index measures the regulation of the unions' pressure potential. "1" indicates that strikes are not allowed; "2" that they are allowed but dependent on the ability of the unions; "3" stands for the permission of strikes and their regulation, but no provision exists on the settlement of conflicts; "4" suggests a strict regulation of strikes which guarantees a high centralization of action with mobilization not being a necessary condition for strike action or state arbitration committees. The third indicator refers to the covering of agreements which unions obtain: "1" collective agreements are forbidden; "2" collective agreements are allowed but covering uncertain; "3" the generalization of collective agreements is likely; "4" collective agreements have a high covering due to state regulation. The fourth and last indicator is concerned with co-determination. It is not allowed ("1"); it is allowed but not regulated "3"; it is allowed and regulated, boards are independent of unions ("4"); like "3", but boards for co-determination are dependent on trade unions (Armingeon 1992: 23-26). Although the summary indicator, which is the sum of the values for the four single indicators, mixes together rather diverse dimensions, it is a good indicator for legal privileges of trade unions. Any of the four dimensions measures the legal regulation of power of trade unions in the respective field. That is not to say it measures the empirical power. It is the scope of formal power of unions guaranteed by legal order. Legal regulation varies quite strongly across countries. The

Scandinavian union systems are the most highly regulated (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden). The least regulated union systems are those of Canada, Japan, and the USA (figure 5, chart 1).


The second variable says whether bargaining takes place at the enterprise or workplace level (1), the industry or regional level (3), or the national level (5). It is a linear transformation of a graphical presentation of level of bargaining presented by Bean (1985: 90) based on OECD sources. The level of bargaining differs considerably across countries. It generally takes place at the national level in Austria, Norway and Sweden, and at the enterprise or workplace level in the USA and Canada. In Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand bargaining normally takes place at the industry or regional level. In France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, and to a certain degree in Japan the level of bargaining is somewhere in between the firm or workplace level and the industry or regional level. No information are available for Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey. This variable indicates how deeply involved peak organizations or union federations are in the bargaining, and therefore it can serve as a measure of the bargaining power of the organizations the analysis focuses on (figure 5, chart 2).

Centralization is our third indicator relating to the dimension of the power of unions. It is regarded to be an important measure of the relative political strength of unions. But it is by no means an easy one. Trade union research offers quite different ways to determine centralization. Sometimes - even worse - various authors use the same concept of centralization, but come up with different values for the degree of union centralization. The determination of centralization in the union systems is largely dependent on expert knowledge. No single or multiple measurement of simple quantitative information seems to suffice to represent the degree of centralization in the union systems. The extent to which the measurement of the centralization depends on the judgement of experts explains why there is such a wide variation. The best way to come up with a fairly reliable score for centralization seems to be to avoid subjective judgement and individual fault by combining scores for centralization from different sources into one. In research on corporatism the same problem occurs and Lijphart and Crepaz have chosen a similar way to come up with a comprehensive score (Lijphart/Crepaz 1991).

Here, seven different scores for centralization from the literature have been combined to form one measure. Three of them are scores, four rank orders of union systems, according to their centralization. The three scores come from Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991: 553), Armingeon (1987: 119), and Czada (1987). The rank orders have been produced by Calmfors and Driffill (1988: 18), Schmitter (1981), Cameron (1984), and Blyth (1979). In the first run, an additional measurement by Bruno and Sachs (1985) was taken into

account. But the correlation analysis revealed that only the seven scores mentioned above showed quite similar structures with significant correlations between them, and no correlation was less than .75.

Figure 5: Legal Regulation, Bargaining, Centralization and Union Power



The synthetical score for centralization in technical terms is quite easy. All seven variables are standardized, the average score then taken for each country and the variable again standardized. The result is a score for centralization which has a mean of zero, a standard deviation of 1, a maximum of 1.75, and a minimum of -1.20. It is available for 18 OECD union systems and missing for Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Centralization varies largely across countries. It is highest in Austria, Norway, and Sweden, lowest in Canada, Japan, and the USA. The West European union systems are fairly centralized, except France, Great Britain, Ireland, and Italy. But variation is large, even if one takes away the most and least centralized ones (figure 5, chart 3).

The fourth measure in the dimension of union power is constructed of variables that measure, according to their authors, the union power or the organizational power of labour.

It faces the same problem as centralization. Determination is largely dependent on experts. Therefore, the same method as for centralization has been used. In this case, four variables have been applied: the index for organizational unity of labour by Cameron (1984: 164) as well as his index of organizational power of unions (1984: 166f.), and the labour organization index by Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991: 553) as well as the same index by Garrett and Lange (1986: 529). Correlations support that they measure quite similar things. They are significant and in no case less than .84. Again, the result is a standardized score for 18 OECD union systems. It has a mean of zero, a standard deviation of 1, a maximum of 1.65, and a minimum of -1.41. The cross-national comparison reveals similarities to centralization, but only as far as the most centralized and most powerful union systems are concerned. According to this indicator, the French and the Japanese union systems are the least and the Austrian, Norwegian, and Swedish the most powerful union systems. The Anglo-saxon union model in general is less powerful than the continental model, except the Latin model of unions (France, Italy) (figure 5, chart 4).

2.3.2. Reduction of Complexity

Up to this point this paper has dealt with the enormous variety of union systems. Eleven (static) variables have been explained, cross-national variations briefly explored. Are there common denominators and can patterns be distinguished which allow for a typology of union systems? It was argued that the indicators theoretically refer to three dimensions: integration, (political) power, and action patterns of union systems. If that is the case in empirical terms, too, reduction of complexity should be feasible.

A parsimonious way to reduce complexity is the method of factor analysis. This is the step chosen here. Eleven variables, among them those referring theoretically to integration (mean density 1970-88; fractionalization, strength of political, religious, and occupational split), and those referring to power (legal regulation; bargaining level; centralization; organizational power), have been included into a factor analysis, with the result being a two-dimensional solution that fits the theoretical considerations nearly without exception (table 2).


Table 3: Factor Analysis of Union System Characteristics

	Factor 1 (Power/- Effectiveness)	Factor 2 (Integration/ Fragmentation)
Mean Union Density 1970-88	.85	-.24
Union System Fractionalization	.05	.92
Political Split (Strength)	-.35	.80
Religious Split (Strength)	-.04	.61
Occupational Split (Strength)	.65	.21
Legal Regulation	.97	.12
Level of Bargaining	.90	-.17
Centralization	.91	-.20
Union Power	.91	-.34
Reduction of Variance	48.6	16.1

Principal-Components Analysis, Varimax Rotation, Kaiser Normalization

In the first factor loading all the variables theoretically considered to be relevant for union power, in the second factor loading three of the five variables related to integration. Deviation from theoretical expectation showed the mean density and the strength of occupational splits. Both belong to the first factor empirically. In other words: empirically density has more in common with the power than with the integration of union systems, and the same is true for the functional - *not* political and religious - differentiation of union systems. The result is striking in several aspects. The first point is that the content of the extracted factors comes very close to what was expected by theoretical or hypothetical considerations. Second, the factors altogether reduce 64 percent of the variance. Third, there are only two factors. That makes the result suitable for a typological undertaking.

There is, of course, a problem: of the eleven variables the one with the most limited scope was only available for 17 countries of the OECD instead of 24. And due to a listwise deletion of data for analysis, another two are not involved in the factor analysis. That means that the typology will be a typology of 15 instead of 24 countries. On the other hand, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. The result of the factor analysis is a comprehensive step toward a meaningful typology. The factor scores from the factor solution can serve as variables for the classification. These will be standardized variables with a mean of zero so that, combining two variables in a scatterplot, a fourfold table appears (see figure 6).

Figure 6


3. Correspondence in Structures of Union Systems and Systems of Business Associations

Corporatist theory and research has shown in various ways and quite convincingly that the concertation of interests in the economic sphere together with the state is of great importance for the performance of the economy as well as for the political system itself. The problem is, however, the empirical basis on which systems are ranked in terms of corporatism, as already mentioned. Corporatism as a mode of generalized exchange between the economic and the political sphere has certain prerequisites of which the structural characteristics of the systems of economic interest organizations are of central importance. Corporatism is defined as a relationship in which tripartite bargaining takes place over subjects central to macro-economic and social policy affairs, with a noticeable effect on those matters. If one accepts this, some implicit assumptions of the concept can be detected. First, the bargaining parties must represent an important portion if not all units

of the respective subsystem, i.e. the political interests, capital and labour interests. Second, they must have the power to execute decisions made in tripartite bargaining in an effective way. This means they must have the capacity to oblige their member units to the commitments made in bargaining. Both conditions are essential for the degree of corporatism, because only if they are provided the expectation might be valid that bargaining results show at least some of the consequences aimed at.

Structurally speaking, this means that the parties of corporatism must have quite some authority over their affiliates and there should be as little differentiation of interest in organizational terms as possible in order to make bargaining successful. Following from this corporatism is only likely - not to say only possible - in the case of powerful and hardly differentiated union systems *and* business interest groups systems. Structural concordance then is a pre-requisite of corporatism and, herewith, for political performance. Looking into the structural correspondence it is not the content of divisions or segmentation that is decisive, but the degree of differentiation in both organizational segments. One can hardly expect to find correspondence in the content of division lines since both segments are of totally different interests. Mainly political divisions are a challenge for the union systems, while for business organization systems it is the differentiation of economic interests.


Figure 7



The degree of differentiation of the two interest subsystems shows, indeed, on the one hand that there is not a single covariance between the union fractionalization and business organization differentiation, but for two groups of countries. The first consists mainly of the anglo-saxon world and shows covariance in both dimensions, starting from a relatively low level of union fractionalization. The second group consists of more or less all the other countries, starting from a higher level of union fractionalization. It appears that countries reported in the literature to be most corporatistic (Schmitter 1981; Crouch 1985), i.e. Austria and the Scandinavian countries, show the lowest level of differentiation in the business organization system, but not with respect to union fractionalization. In this respect they take a medium position (figure 7).

Turning to the correspondence in power, the result is even more straightforward. First of all, there is quite a strong correspondence between power of unions and power of employers. Second, the countries reported to be most corporatistic do not only show - as most of the others do - correspondence in the degree of power, but they even belong to the countries with the highest power in both organizational sectors (see figure 8). Austria, Norway and Sweden have the strongest economic interest group system, followed by Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany. In the consociational democracies Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, together with Germany, business power is in all cases comparatively larger than that of the unions. The answer to the question whether this is a result which can be systematically attributed to the characteristic of the political system or not needs some more research.

Figure 8:



The correspondence in structure, especially with respect to the power dimension, validates the classifications of corporatist countries that can be found in the literature. On the other hand, it supports the hypothesis that structural correspondence in the system of economic interests might be decisive for the impact on political and economic performance. And last but not least, with this result one can expect to have a new powerful predictor of political performance, especially with the dimension of power of organized business.

5. Structures of Economic Interest Organisations and Socio-Economic Performance

It is a common knowledge that the activities of unions and business associations could and sometimes have a strong impact on socio-economic performance. This has been shown by what can be regarded as *economic performance models*, in which structural variables of organisations (Crouch 1983, Golden 1993, Visser 1991), bargaining structures (Lehner 1987, Soskice 1990) or political variables (Alvarez, Garrett, Lange 1991, Cameron 1984) serve as independent variables to explain inflation, unemployment, etc. Most of these studies refer to outcome measures as performance measures. However, in advanced democracies the interplay between interest groups, parties and governments play an important role for economic performance (Alvarez, Garrett, Lange 1991, Cameron 1984, Lange, Meadwell 1991). Thus, a policy perspective on performance would complement these perspectives. However, *policy models*, which go beyond expenditure data for particular areas can hardly be found. One of the rare pieces is Marks' work on union structures and consensual income policies. Here, a preliminary attempt will be made to relate structures of systems of economic interest groups, policy outputs and policy outcomes with respect to policies affecting employment and thus income, income policies and the distribution of income. Unfortunately, a full-blown model cannot be presented due to data limitations. Evidence can be provided only by bivariate analyses.

5.1. Structural Correspondence between Labour and Business and Corporatist Policy-Making

In the last section it has been emphasized that structural correspondence might be a major precondition for the capacity of labour and capital for corporatist policy making. The argument is obvious: only if both organizational sectors have sufficient resources to make binding decisions for their members, results of negotiations at the top can be implemented

at the bottom. That is, a certain degree of „encompassiveness“ must be reached in order to make decisions which will be relevant and accepted.

The analysis of the structures of union systems and systems of business organizations have revealed that there is in general great correspondence with respect to the degree of differentiation and the degree of power between both organizational sectors in most systems. In particular with respect to power (which includes power vis-a-vis the organisation(s) as well as external power) this is true. The power dimension is for theoretical reasons clearly the more important one with respect to corporatist policy-making. Thus, analyses will be limited to relate power structures and outputs as well as outcomes.

In order to capture the degree of correspondence in structure between business and labour with respect to the power dimension, a variable was created which is the product of the standardized score for the power of union systems and the power of systems of business interests. Correlation between this combined score and the scores for each sector clearly show the high correspondence. Correlation between the summary score of power of economic interests and the power of union systems is .98 and for the power of business .82. This again stresses what has been shown in the last section: in general, correspondence is very high: where unions are weak, this is true also for business associations; where unions are strong, business is strong.

The normal procedure would be to include the single scores and the interaction term as independent variables in a regression in order to explore how strong the interaction, i.e. the correspondence in structure affects policy or outcome variables. However, data limitations leave us with a little more than two hands full of cases. This limited number of cases does not allow for a multivariate perspective. Thus, only bivariate correlations can be compared.

Policy Outputs

Turning to policies first, the question is as to which degree correspondence in structure of economic interest groups of both sectors are of importance for corporatist policy-making. Income policies as well as unemployment policies are classical fields of corporatism, ‘concerted actions’ and the like. Thus one would expect a strong relation between these corporatist measures and organizational structures.

Turning to income policies first, we rely on an indicator derived from Marks (1986). In his article on neo-corporatism and income policy provides information about the periods where active income policy by the governments in 15 OECD countries took place between 1950 and 1980. He also characterizes the policies on a bipolar dimension "compulsory vs. consensual" policy. According to the information and advice in the article, mean scores for consensual income policy were calculated. The score reflects the weighted average of time

of governmental income policy. As weight serves the scores Marks attributes to the character of the policy, i.e. compulsory vs. consensual.

Correlations show that the power of economic interest groups is a strong determinant or covariant factor of consensual income policy. Concerning each sector, i.e. unions and business, clearly unions characteristics matter more. The interaction of power structures of business and unions, however, show a correlation as high. Bearing in mind, that the correlation between the interaction of power of unions and business is very high, this clearly indicates that where correspondence is high, consensual income policies take place more frequently. Correlation between the interaction of structure and consensual income policy is 69 percent of the variance in consensual income policies (table 4).

Turning to employment policies, analysis is based on information on spending for active employment measures and measures for income maintenance in case of unemployment. Data stem from Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). The same pattern reappear although correlations are not as high as in the case of income policies. Again, correlations between organizational power of the business association system and policies are not as high as for union systems' power. Again, the interaction of power of both sectors show correlations as high as for unions. This again points to the fact that the correspondence in structure plays an important role. Correlations are clearly weaker, but still significant on the .05-level (table 4).

Table 4: Structure of Economic Interest Group Systems and Policy Outputs

	Organizational Power of		
	Employers' and Trade Assoc.	Trade Unions	Employers' * Trade Unions
Consensual income policy ^a	.54 (.07)	.82 (.00)	.83 (.00)
Active employment measures ^b	.26 (.26)	.49 (.04)	.49 (.04)
Measures for income maintenance ^c	.50 (.02)	.60 (.01)	.60 (.01)
Employment measures total ^d	.40 (.08)	.58 (.01)	.57 (.01)

a 12 countries; source: Marks 1986.

b min. 17 cases; source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 479. Spending on active measures for employment as a percentage of GDP 1987, standardized by percentage of unemployed..

c min. 17 cases; source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 479. Spending on unemployment compensation and early retirement for labour market reasons as a percentage of GDP 1987, standardized by percentage of unemployed.

d min 17 cases; source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 479. Total spending on employment measures as a percentage of GDP 1987 (b+c), standardized by percentage of unemployed.

Summing up the findings, it is obvious that there is a close relationship between structural characteristics of organized business and labour and corporatist policy-making. Even more

important, results seem to support the assumption that it is not the structure of one organizational sector alone, i.e. either business or labour, but the correspondence which matters. Where power is large in both organizational sectors, more or stronger corporatistic policy measures are taken.

Outputs and Outcomes

Before turning to the relationship between structural characteristics of organized business and labour and economic performance measures, we will briefly inspect the relationship between policies and economic performance. This is because economic performance can be an outcome of the economic actions of unions and business organizations, but in corporatist arenas an important intervening variable are policies. Again referring to income and employment policies, the two related outcomes are income and employment. One would expect - given the emphasis of corporatist income policies on relative equality - that consensual income policies lead to greater income equality. Employment measures, in particular measures for income maintenance should also influence income distributions toward greater equality. Active measures for employment as well as consensual income policies both should reduce unemployment, in the latter case because of the wage-employment effect.

Bivariate correlations all reflect the expected direction. Consensual income policies as well as measures for income maintenance in case of unemployment have a strong positive effect on all three measures of income distribution explored. The impact of active employment measures and consensual income policies is much weaker and statistically not significant, although in the expected direction (table 5).

Thus, we have detected so far small chain which can be regarded as a causal one for theoretical reasons: structures of economic interest groups and in particular the correspondence in structure between systems of business associations and unions systems affect policies, policies affect outcomes. Given the fact that the economic actions of business and labour taken independently of the state also affects outcomes (wage level effect on employment and income distributions), the third element of the chain is the relationship between structures of economic interest groups and outcomes.

Table 5: Policies and Policy Outcomes: Income Equality and Employment

	Consensual Income Policy ^a	Active Employment Measures ^b	Measures for Income Maintenance ^c	Employment Measures Total ^d
INCOME EQUALITY				
- Income Equality in the '80s ^e	.73 (.01)	.23 (.35)	.55 (.02)	.34 (.17)
- Income of Bottom Decile as Percentage of Median, late '80s ^f	.52 (.12)	.19 (.51)	.63 (.02)	.38 (.18)
- Income of Top Decile as Percentage of Median, late '80s ^g	-.86 (.00)	-.52 (.05)	-.69 (.01)	-.64 (.01)
UNEMPLOYMENT^h	-.44 (.15)	-.36 (.12)	-.03 (.89)	-.26 (.26)

a 12 countries; source: Marks 1986.

b min. 17 cases; source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 479. Spending on active measures for employment as a percentage of GDP 1987, standardized by percentage of unemployed..

c min. 17 cases; source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 479. Spending on unemployment compensation and early retirement for labour market reasons as a percentage of GDP 1987, standardized by percentage of unemployed.

d min 17 cases; source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 479. Total spending on employment measures as a percentage of GDP 1987 (b+c), standardized by percentage of unemployed.

e Equality in household income. Source: Cusack 1994


f Household income, standardized to persons. Source: Atkinson 1996:18.

g Household income, standardized to persons. Source: Atkinson 1996:18.

h Percent unemployed. Source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 6, 398.

Structures and Outcomes

To systematize the above assumptions a little more, the general idea of the relationship between structures of economic interest groups, policies and outcomes can be summed up in a small model of the following form:



Thus, we would expect a clear relationship between structures of economic interest groups and outcomes with respect to income distribution and employment. Correlations support this expectation. Structural characteristics of each single organisations sector, i.e. business and labour, show quite high correlations with outcomes. This is clearly true with respect to income distribution indicators. For unemployment they point into the expected direction

but are quite weak. Correlations are on average highest between the interaction measure of business/labour structure and outcomes (table 6). This again highlights the relevance of correspondence in structure in both organizational segments for its impact on the performance of the overall economic system.

Table 6: Structure of Economic Interest Group Systems and Outcomes

	Employers' and Trade Assoc.	Organizational Power of Trade Unions	Employers' * Trade Unions
INCOME EQUALITY			
- Income Equality in the 80s ^e	.61 (.01)	.59 (.01)	.60 (.01)
- Income of Bottom Decile as Percentage of Median, late 80s ^f	.63 (.01)	.59 (.03)	.63 (.02)
- Income of Top Decile as Percentage of Median, late 80s ^g	-.74 (.00)	-.89 (.00)	-.92 (.00)
UNEMPLOYMENT^h	-.27 (.25)	-.43 (.07)	-.47 (.05)

e Equality in household income. Source: Cusack 1994

f Household income, standardized to persons. Source: Atkinson 1996:18.

g Household income, standardized to persons. Source: Atkinson 1996:18.

h Percent unemployed. Source: Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991: 6, 398.

6. Summary

In this paper an attempt was made to investigate the structure of economic interest groups and its relationship to policy outputs and outcomes. The general hypothesis pursued was that structural correspondence in systems of business associations and union systems is of crucial importance for the degree as to which corporatist policy making is likely to occur. The consideration behind the hypothesis is that only in case of structural correspondence bargaining and negotiations between the parties as well as with third parties for a common purpose can be successful and meaningful. This general consideration is largely discussed in the debate about corporatism. However, most empirical analyses have neglected so far to look into some more detail of the structures of organized business. Many ratings of the degree of corporatism are based on the characteristics of unions systems alone.

Analyses of the structures of both organizational sectors have shown that differentiation or fragmentation, on the one hand, and power in organizational terms, on the other hand,

are the two general dimensions by which these systems differ most apparently among OECD countries. It has also been shown that the correspondence in structure between organized business and unions is very high. Where business interests are highly differentiated union systems are highly fragmented. Where business associations are very powerful, unions are too. The correspondence is in particular high with respect to structural characteristics of power of both organizational systems.

In order to investigate whether structures matter or not, an analysis of the relationship between structures, policies and outcomes has been performed. Emphasis was put on the question whether it is the structure of organized business and labour independently of each other which matters or whether the correspondence in structure is of importance. This question was investigated in two central areas of corporatist policy making, income and employment regarding policies as well as outcomes. Empirical results support the expectations: where unions and business organizations are powerful, more corporatist policy making occurs. But there is also an effect on outcomes, i.e. income distribution and unemployment. Where both, unions and business are powerful in organizational terms, income distribution is more equal and unemployment lower. This might be an effect of two factors. On the one hand, structural characteristics of economic interests have an effect on policies which in turn affect outcomes. The first as well as the latter have been demonstrated in the paper. Second, economic actions independent of the state, i.e. independent of policies, might have a direct effect on these two outputs (for example a wage level effect on income as well as on employment). Since the impact of policies on outcomes is lower than of the structure of economic interest groups on outcomes there is some evidence that the effect autonomous economic action plays a very important role for the economic performance of a society. Summing up, structures of economic interest groups in particular the structural correspondence between organized business and labour matter strongly for corporatist policy making and economic performance.

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