

Interest Groups and Political Representation in Europe

Bernhard Wessels

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB)

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin

Phone: (030) 25491-315

Email: wessels@medea.wz-berlin.de

Paper for presentation at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR

Bern, February 27- March 4, 1997

Workshop 13, „Political Representation“, directed by Jacques Thomassen

Interest Groups and Political Representation in Europe

Bernhard Wessels, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB)

1. Introduction

Political procedures of liberal democracy are designed to ensure responsiveness of elected to the electors. Voting rights, freedom of speech and association, equality of information and the predominance of the electoral decision over intervening decisions are designed to ensure that elected representatives do carry out public desires. That is, all conceptions of democratic government hinge upon some form of control of leaders by non-leaders (Dahl 1975). As simple as this idea is, as complex is the practice of political representation. Given the complexity and multiplicity of interests in modern societies it can be argued without further hesitation that it is impossible for representatives to find out what public desires and demands are if they solely rely on individual citizens or the electoral process alone. That is why social groups are so important in political life in general and political representation in particular. Without aggregation of interests of individuals to collective demands, interests are either not visible enough, or too unstructured or too complex or all of it together to be recognized correctly by political actors and to call for the degree of necessary responsiveness.

The importance of group theory has been highlighted in interest group research ever since. In particular traditional pluralistic approaches emphasize that politics is the result of the competition of different organized interests (Bentley 1908; Truman 1951). However, this view neglects at least partly the importance of politics for the genesis and role of interest groups. Fraenkel, representing a

modified approach to pluralism has pointed to the fact that the state cannot be subsumed under the competition model of pluralism since the state performs a special role having the monopoly of legitimate power (Fraenkel 1968, pp 45-46). For political representation this is a very important point since it makes clear that interest groups act vis-à-vis the state. Even more, one can argue that many interest groups came into existences just because there is a state. The history of interest groups systems shows that in many cases the competences of the state have been the primary motive to found interest groups. Trade associations, for example, have been founded to protect national capital against foreign capital (see Feldman, Homburg 1977). Other examples show that the state invited social interests to organize as an interest group in order to have a party to speak to (British employers in the 60s). Many more examples show that increasing competences of the state have brought about interest groups. And even in cases where this seems to be not so obvious, for example in case of labour unions, it can be argued that unions have been founded in order to receive legal recognition for workers interests and to implement bargaining structures with the rules of the game being protected by the state (see for example Armingeon 1992).

This fact is important for the relationship between political representation and interest groups in at least two ways:

1. If it is true that increasing competences of the state are the major force in the creation of interest groups, a process of co-evolution of the state or its competences and interest groups should occur. This point is of special importance for political representation at the European level and the role of national and supra-national interest groups;
2. If state structures determine the role and behaviour of interest groups the implication is that interest groups first of all organize in the context and within the structures of the nation state. This also implies that mainly the state defines the ways of interaction with interest groups, or in other words: mainly

the state defines the way, interest groups are embedded in the process of political representation.

Both aspects will be tentatively explored here. They have different implications for what interest groups and political representation in Europe can mean. Whereas the first point gives some room for speculations about political representation and interest groups in the course of European integration, the second point emphasizes the importance of the boundaries of the nation state for political representation with the help of interest groups. With respect to further European integration and representation at the European level the two aspects might even contradict each other.

This paper concentrates on four aspects of interest groups and political representation and tries to highlight the implication for political representation with the help of interest group at the European level in particular:

- the variety of modes of political representation interest groups can be embedded in
- whether interest groups matter for political representation
- the diversity and persistence of national patterns of interest groups
- the co-evolution of a European state and European interest groups.

2. Interest Groups and Modes of Interest Representation

The notion of political representation in connection with interest groups is clearly related to *functional* in contrast to *territorial representation*. Interest groups are generally defined as organizations, separate from government which attempt to influence public policy. They provide institutionalized linkage between government or the state and major interests in society (Wilson1990:1). This is why many authors have pointed to the fact that structures of interest organizations and representation add a "second circuit" to the "machinery of the democratic representative polity" (Offe 1981: 141). Stein Rokkan, already in

1966, put forward the interpretation of a "two-tiers system" in which "votes count but resources decide" - with the vote potential constituting "only one among many different power resources in ... bargaining processes" with associations part of (Rokkan 1966: 105). For political representation this has the implication of "corporate pluralism" limiting the importance of the majoritarian principle. It does not, however, limit the importance of representative institutions rather than complement the system of government.

However, in theoretical and normative terms it is not at all clear which role interest groups can and should play in political representation in a narrow sense. Corporatist approaches had often been developed with reference to classic political theories of representation. But a system of representation of organized interests differs from a system of representation of individuals. In particular, the absence of the electoral majoritarian mechanism of individual representation raises difficult problems of the legitimacy of representation by interest groups and their impact on decision-making processes. The difficulty lies in the fact that corporate representation cannot gain legitimacy by universal accepted institutional mechanisms as can representative bodies such as parliaments or governments being legitimized by elections (Lehmbruch 1982). Representation by interest groups is legitimate only in the border lines of speaking for their members. Anything going beyond this point needs "external" legitimation by legitimized political bodies. (This is the normative point of view in line with democratic theory. This does not imply that this is the reality of interest representation. In many instances researches have gained the impression that the state is "colonialized" by interest groups).

The modes of representation externally legitimized, however, vary considerably. Interest groups can act *vis-à-vis* the state, *in cooperation* with the state or even *on behalf of the state*. All three aspects can be found realized in varying degrees in European societies. They represent different strategies of the state to increase the steering capacity within the political system.

Still the most important form of political steering is "*etatism*". This is the autonomous political steering of the state where the state does solely rely on his own resources. This is still the dominant type. Policies coming into existence by etatistic means often causes reactions by interest groups in the sense of pressure politics. In this case interest groups act vis-à-vis the state.

The second general type of political steering which can be differentiated into three subtypes, relies on the resources and knowledge of interest groups and embeds them into three different modes of political representation.

One mode is *subsidiarity*. In this case the state does not interfere in areas which are self-governed by interest groups as long as they show the ability of sufficient problem solving (Glagow, Schimank 1984: 541). Welfare is a typical field of subsidiarity and self governance by large welfare associations, for example in Germany and other European nations (see Schmid 1996). In this case, interest groups „represent“ in the sense that they decide on policies and implement them, often supported financially by state.

The second non-etatistic mode is based on *delegation* of formal power to interest groups by the state. In this case interest associations have to fulfill specific tasks on behalf of the government. However, in this case interest groups are normally not private voluntary associations but are based on obligatory membership. Examples are the chambers of commerce and the crafts. In this case interest groups self-govern particular sectors of society with state-like authority.

The third and in the discussion about interest groups most prominent mode of representation by interest groups is *corporatism*. In contrast to subsidiarity and delegation, corporatism is structurally a bargaining system. Whereas in the case of subsidiarity and delegation the state attributes a particular policy field to

interest groups for self-governance, the characteristic of corporatism is that content and form of a policy are a matter of negotiations (Lehmbruch, Schmitter 1982; Schmitter, Lehmbruch 1979). It is a pluri-dimensional concept (Lehmbruch 1982:2) and applies to different forms of arrangements. Most prominent is the tripartite arrangement between government, unions, and employers. But it has been established in many more policy fields (for example health) and on different levels (local corporatism). Its common characteristic is that interest groups act as equal partners of the state. It is a specific structure of exchange in which interest groups not only represent the interest of their members vis-à-vis the state but also state's interest vis-à-vis their members. Thus, corporatism is not a one-way-route but a transaction structure designed to act out commonly defined policies effectively.

Thus, political representation by and with the help of interest groups can take various forms. Which form it takes and which mode is established depends on the one hand to a high degree on the decision of the representative institutions which solely manage the resources necessary to implement the different modes, i.e. legitimate power and the formal power to delegate power. It depends, on the other hand, on the structures of the interest groups system representative institutions can rely on. Both aspects are, however, intertwined. Demand for cooperation from the state often changes the structures of organized interest, existing structures of organized interest facilitate opportunity structures for the state to cooperate.

3. Interest Mediation in the European Context: Diversity and Impact

That interest groups matter for political representation can be regarded as a common wisdom. There are, however, different positions whether their impact on policies is to the better or worse (Visser 1990). But the dominant view is that

their influence is positive. Political economy in particular has shown, that the impact is positively with respect to macro-economic outcomes. This is the macro-perspective. With respect to political representation it is also important to ask whether interest groups really act in the interest of their members and people they do represent. This is a point of debate (see Franke, Dobson 1985). This is because intra-group representation faces similar problems as do the representation of constituencies by representatives. But empirical evidence show that people by and large do feel to be represented by at least one interest group. Interestingly enough, in Europe more people regard themselves to be represented by an interest group than by a political party (see table). This is at least some indication that the policy preferences of members and leaders of interest groups are linked.

Feeling to be Represented by Interest Groups and Political Parties in Europe

	Interest Groups %	Political Parties %
France	95	69
Belgium	96	81
Netherlands	97	89
W-Germany	95	76
Italy	96	80
Luxembourg	95	64
Denmark	96	84
Ireland	97	86
Great Britain	94	81
Greece	92	57
Spain	98	68
Portugal	98	63
E-Germany	93	76

Source: Representative telephone survey of mass public 1994. Research project „Intermediary Institutions and Political Participation“, funded by the Thyssen Foundation, directed by Bernhard Wessels. Sample size 500 per country, except for West Germany (1000). Cumulated answers to the question of feeling to be represented by 9 different interest groups categories and all relevant political parties.

Thus it is not too heroic to assume that the impact interest groups have on policies and political outcomes reflects by and large what members and clients demand for.

The impact of interest groups on policies seems to be quite strong. Many case studies on legislation show that interest groups are highly involved in law-


making. However, comparative research covering the whole range of policy areas is not existing. But there is a vast amount of literature on interest groups and economic policies, in particular income, unemployment, and economic performance in general. Reviewing the literature, Lange and Meadwell (1991: 95), argue that "some systemic outcomes are better explained by institutional arrangements in the corporatist circuit than by arrangements in the parties-cabinet-legislature nexus". Cameron (1984), for example, found a strong relationship between the organizational power of labour and the control of government by leftist party, a fact undoubtedly influencing political representation. Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991) have found that the interplay between unions and political parties is of direct relevance to macroeconomic performance, which points to the dimension of politically influenced economic performance, and the problem of an "integrative" policy. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) report a relation between centralization of unions and macroeconomic performance, Lange and Garret (1985), Hicks (1988), and others show that the organizational strength of labour unions is a source of long-term growth insofar as it is complemented by a strong left party in government. The influence of interest politics and their structures on income and adjustment policies has been singled out by Marks (1986), Czada (1987), and others. Golden (forthcoming) and Wallerstein (1990) point to the fact that union structures directly affect the social order; they have an effect on whether conflict and militancy is chosen as a strategy to pursue labour interests. Wessels (1996) has shown that the structure of organized business and labour directly have an impact on income policies, active employment measures and measure for income maintenance.

The most important message which can be drawn from this research with respect to interest groups and political representation is, that the mode how interest groups are embedded in the representational structure and the structure of the intermediary systems itself is of crucial importance for the impact of and thus the representation by interest groups.

Research has clearly shown that the stronger the corporatist mode of representation is implemented, the stronger the impact of interest groups. The degree of corporatism varies considerably among the memberstates of the European Union, including highly corporatist countries like Austria, and Sweden, and non-corporatistic like Italy. National patterns of organizational culture are highly diverse. Membership rates in interest groups vary from a low 20 percent in Spain to more than 80 percent in Sweden (Wessels 1997). Diversity is even stronger with respect to structures of organizational systems. Union systems and systems of organized business in Europe, for example, vary between high internal and external power and high and low fragmentation (for illustration see the following figures).


The major point about the diversity is, that this is a persisting pattern. There is no sign that there is a process of a kind of convergence of the structures of intermediary systems. Neither party systems nor systems of organized interest converge. They are deeply rooted in the social and political history of nations, depend largely on early established cleavage structures (Lipset, Rokkan 1967).

The Diversity of Systems of Organized Business



Source: Wessels (1996)

Diversity of Union Systems



Source: Wessels (1996)

Visser and Ebbinghaus (1992), Streeck (1996) and others have pointed to this fact with and have discussed the implications for interest groups representation at the European level. The message is similar in these researches: national pattern persist and define clear constraints for the formation of European interest groups.


4. Co-Evolution of a European Political System and European Interest Groups?

Political representation without the participation of interest groups seems to be impossible, thinking even within the boundaries of nation states. Looking ahead towards a European political system coming up in the course of further European integration, it seems to be even more important to take organized groups into account. The sheer number of people being represented by members of the European Parliament, for example, as compared to the numbers within the European nations, makes clear that a representational linkage between electors and representatives at the European level is much more difficult to realize.

However, it is doubtful, at least to some authors, whether supra-national interest groups can be expected to function in an analogous manner. Kirchner and Schwaiger (1981: 4) criticize the functionalist assumption after which nation state-bound approaches to interests groups can apply to European interest groups. In their view this assumption neglects those functions that are peculiar to the supranational context. But they nevertheless agree to the argument that European integration and representation in Europe cannot be based on political institutions alone. As Alois Pfeiffer, member of the Commission of the European Communities put it: „It would indeed be condemned to superficiality were it not supported by representative socio-political forces...“ (foreword to Barnouin 1986). And in general, the institutionalization of an intermediary system at the European level appears to have much in common with the

development of interest groups at the nation state level. As in national boundaries the formation of interest groups can be regarded as a correlate of the growing competence of the „European state“. Supranational interest organizations seem to come into being with the growing power of European political institutions.

Most authors on European interest groups agree at least with the point that „the development of the power of the European Economic Community has given rise to reaction from those interests, which are most directly affected.“ (Sisjanski 1972: 401). A simplified model of „co-evolution“, detected in the process of European interest group formation for example by Kirchner (1978: 4), who calls it „the circle of institutionalization“, illustrates the genesis of interest groups:



„Circle of Institutionalization“, adopted from Kirchner 1978: 4.

In this respect, it is not so important whether community policies directly influence group's exercise of demand and pressure or whether organizational strength of one actor provokes another set of interests to counter this influence (Kirchner/Schwaiger 1981: 5). Whether growing competence of the European

level or growing competition between interests on the European scene, both developments are two sides of the same coin - the growing competence of the (supranational) state.

Sidjanski (1972) separates several phases of interest group formation at the continental level, each caused by the emergence of a new center of political decisions. The first wave started, when the Marshall plan and the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) were launched. „They were mostly groupings with a very loose structure, mirroring in this sense the loose power“ with which European institutions were vested. The next wave started from 1952 on with upsetting the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), bringing up about ten new organizations, most of them specialized. 1958, the EEC commission (European Economic Community) was launched and this had more profound effects: this third wave was the birthday of many European level federations.

However, already the first wave can be regarded as the catalyst force toward an European intermediary system. The following figure indicates that the process started in the economic sphere: first emerged federations of the service and commerce sector, than industry and agriculture and than banking. In contrast to this, European level federations of social and political interests such as the ETUC (trade unions) and organizations of the professions came much later. Supranational party organizations have not been founded before 1976 (see the following figure).

Indeed, the developments of European interest groups validates to some extent what has been called in functionalist integration theories „spill-over“ (Haas 1964) and with respect to building of political institutions and private interest organizations a process of „co-evolution“ (Kohler-Koch 1995).

FOUNDING OF IMPORTANT INTERMEDIARY ORGANISATIONS IN THE EC

		E C O N O M Y				PROFESSIONS		PUBLIC INT. PARTIES
		Industry	Services	Commerce	Agric./Crafts	Unions	Professions	
Service and Commerce	1951			FIPMEC (Small/Medium)		CIC (Executiv Staff)		
	1952							
	1953	CEA (Insurance)						
	1954							
	1955					CIF (Public Servants)		
	1956							
	1957			COCCEE (Commercial) EUROCOOP (Consumer Co-op)				
Industry and Agriculture	1958	UNICE (Industry)		Chamber of Commerce				
			IRU (Road Transport)					
					COPA (Agricultur)			
					COGECA (Agric. Co-op.) UACEE (Crafts)			
Banking	1959			Banking Federation				
	1960							
	1961							
	1962				BEUC (Consumer)			
	1963			GCECEE (Savings Banks)				
	1964							
	1965	CEEP (Public Enterpr.)						
	1966							
	1967							
	1968							
	1969							
1970								
1971								
1972	EUROPMI (Small/Medium Ind.)							
Professions and Parties	1973					ETUC (Unions)	EUD (Dentists)	EEB Environmental
	1974							
	1975						SEPLIS (Professions)	EPP C.o.Soc.Parties Liberal Federat.
	1976							

But this is not the whole story. Kohler-Koch (1996) has pointed out that another factor influence the emergence of European interest groups is whether they attempt to organize diffuse or specific interests. Diffuse interests face two constraints: the first is that they are much harder to organize, the second, that they have also not been homogenously organized at the national level. Her observation is that the emergence of European interest groups is not only related to the question of growing competence but also whether supranational organizations can build on national interest groups with a high degree of centralization and concentration (Kohler-Koch 1996: 195).

This brings us back to the problem of the heterogeneity and diversity of interest group systems within the nation states of Europe. With respect to unions which built quite strongly on national cultures, this has been emphasized by Visser and Ebbighaus (1992). This is not only true for unions but for all interest groups organizing a mass-membership (Kohler-Koch 1996:195). Given the problem to create representative linkages at the national level, „it is clear that these problems are even bigger at the transnational level of the European Community“ (Schendelen 1991: 359). This has not so much to do with the „degree of pluralism“ in Europe, as Schendelen put it, but with the diversity of structures and cultures. The implications are manifold.


- One implication is that European interest associations are weak federations of federations, often unable to agree and act upon meaningful common positions (Kirchner, Schwaiger 1981; Greenwood, Grote, Ronit 1992: 5). There are, however, some examples of such super federations which show that coherent and decisive action is possible, for example pharmaceuticals (Greenwood, Ronit 1992). But it is obvious that representation of interest at the European level still depends to a high degree on national interest groups.
- A second implication is that representation of interests is unequal. Those showing some of the necessary conditions of firm organization (high homogeneity of interests, high organizational concentration at the national

level) have greater chances to be heard at the European level. Figures of the European Commission speak a clear language in this respect: industry has the most European interest groups, second comes commerce. Unions, consumers and small entrepreneurs (handicrafts), rank last (see figures in Eising, Kohler-Koch 1994:192).

- A third implication is that representation of organized interests of different countries is unequal. This can be shown by looking to the distribution of memberships in advisory boards and committees at the European level among national peak associations: since any peak association is called to have a seat, national systems with several peak associations in one sector, for example unions or business associations, cannot gain the centrality in the networks of policy formulation as national systems with unitary federations. Where organized interests are fragmented at the national level, communication capacities at the European level are reduced (see with respect to social policy and the policy field labor Pappi and Schnorpfeil 1996: 152-154).

With respect to the third point more research has to be done on other sectors, although it is quite likely that the pattern will re-appear in other areas. For point 1 and 2, empirical evidence, drawn from a survey among the Members of the European Parliament in 1996 (research project „Political Representation in Europe: European Members of Parliaments Study“, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and University of Twente [Wessels, Kielhorn, Thomassen 1997]) support the expectations.

It can clearly be seen from the distribution of contacts of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that in business has the best access to this representative body. Furthermore, national interest groups seem to be of greater importance, measured by the distribution of contacts, than European interest groups (see figure).



Source: Survey among MEPs, 1996; Wessels, Kielhorn, Thomassen 1997.

These findings support the notion that the linkages which can be provided by interest groups in order to facilitate political representation at the European level is anything but easy to realize. Even though, with respect to interest groups one problem seems to be solved at the first glance, i.e. the problems and traps of territorial representation, since interest group representation refers to functional representation seems to be only partly valid at the European level. As long as national federations play a major role in linking interests in European societies and the European level as long it can be expected that this includes a defense against union wide politics in order to protect national interests (Streeck 1996). Obviously, this must not contradict political representation at the European level. It makes it, however, a much less smooth task as promoters of functionalist integration theory would acknowledge.

5. Interest Groups and Political Representation in Europe

This paper has highlighted some important aspects and problems of the relationship between interest groups and political representation in Europe. The first question answered, was of general, more conceptual nature: which role can interest groups play in political representation? The general argument is, that the mode of representation by interest groups is to a high degree dependent on the decisions of legitimized political institutions in two aspects: one the one hand, political competences and intervention of the state in many cases is the reason for the founding of interest groups. This argument is of central relevance in particular for representation at the European level by interest groups since it assumes at least in part some kind of co-evolution of governmental institutions and interest groups. The role of existing interest groups in political representation is, on the other hand, to a high degree defined by governmental institutions. In normative terms, interest groups can only speak for themselves and their members. In cases where their role goes further, they need external legitimation or approval by democratically legitimized political institutions. The mode of representation than is clearly defined by the state. Subsidiarity, delegation as well as corporatism are modes of political representation by interest groups which the state chooses and only the state can choose since they rest to a certain degree on the allocation of some kind of formal authority. The mirror of this is, that the representative institutions can only make a choice in the limits that the structure of organized interests fits to the one or another mode.

Of importance for the role of interest groups at the European level is of this aspect, that the modes of representation by interest groups and the structure of interest group systems show a high degree of diversity across Europe. This has several implications. First: the ability of interest groups to form European federations differs not only between different sectors. It also differs between nations. The more homogenous and centralized interests are organized at the

national level the more easy is it to come up with a European solution. The more the degree of homogeneity and centralization differs between nations the more difficult to found a strong European federation. Second: on the European level not only European federations have a ear but also national federations are formally integrated in decision procedures. Since the fragmentation of interests in one sector differs between countries, their impact differs also at the European level. The more fragmented a national organizational culture, the less powerful interest groups can act at the European level. Thus, the representation of the same interests is unequal between nations. Third: since interest groups are so deeply rooted in national cultures they cannot avoid to bring in the territorial dimension of interests. Thus, the principle idea and hope that representation with the help of interest groups is more easy at the European level than the traditional political representation dealing with the territorial dimension cannot be confirmed.

Summing up, it seems to be obvious, that political representation is not possible without interest groups, in particular not at the European level. The suspicion is, however, that political representation does not become less complex by this, but more complex. But this is probably the price for the improvement of the quality of democratic representation at the European level.

References

- Alvarez, R. Michael/Geoffrey Garrett/Peter Lange: Government partisanship, labor organization, and macroeconomic performance, in: *American Political Science Review*, Jg. 85, S. 539-556.
- Armingeon, Klaus: Staat und Arbeitsbeziehungen - Ein internationaler Vergleich, Abschlußbericht für die DFG über das geförderte Projekt 'Regulierung der Arbeitsbeziehungen', Heidelberg 1992 (mimeo).
- Barnouin, Barbara: *The European labour movement and European integration*, London/Wolfeboro: Frances Pinter 1986.
- Barnouin, Barbara: *The European labour movement and European integration*, London/Wolfeboro: Frances Pinter 1986.
- Bentley, Arthur F. (1908): *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Cambridge.
- Calmfors, Lars/John Driffill: Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance, in: *Economic Policy* 3, 1988, S. 13-61.
- Cameron, David R.: Social democracy, corporatism, labour quiescence, and the representation of economic interest in advanced capitalist society, in: John H. Goldthorpe (Hrsg.), *Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism: Studies in the political economy of Western European Nations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984.
- Czada, Roland: The impact of interest politics on flexible adjustment policies, in: Hans Keman/Heikki Paloheimo/Paul F. Whiteley (Hrsg.), *Coping with the economic crisis*, London et al.: Sage 1987, S. 20-53.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1975): Governments and political oppositions, in: Fred I. Greenstein/Nelson W. Polsby, *Macropolitical theory*, *Handbook of Political Science*, Jg. 3, Reading, MA u.a.: Addison-Wesley, pp. 115-174.
- Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities: *European interest groups and their relationship with the economic and social committee*, Westmead: Saxon House 1980.
- Eising, Rainer/Beate Kohler-Koch (1994), Inflation und Zerschlagung: Trends der Interessenvermittlung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: *Staat und Verbände*, Sonderheft 25 der Politischen Vierteljahresschrift, edited by Wolfgang Streeck, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, S. 176-206.

- Feldman, Gerald D./Heidrun Homberg (1977): *Industrie und Inflation: Studien und Dokumente zur Politik der deutschen Unternehmer 1916-1923*, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.
- Fraenkel, Ernst (1968): *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien*, Stuttgart u.a.: Kohlhammer.
- Franke, James L./Douglas Dobson (1985): Interest groups: The problem of representation, in: *The Western Political Quarterly*, Jg. 38, Nr. 2, pp. 224-237.
- Glagow, Manfred/Uwe Schimank (1984): Gesellschaftssteuerung durch korporatistische Verhandlungssysteme. Zur begrifflichen Klärung, in: Jürgen W.Falter/Christian Fenner/Michael Th. Greven (Hrsg.), *Politische Willensbildung und Interessenvermittlung*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 527-526.
- Golden, Miriam: *The dynamics of trade unionism and national economic performance*, Irvine 1993.
- Greenwood, Justin/Jürgen R. Grote, Karsten Ronit (eds.) (1992), *Organized Interests and the European Community*, London: Sage.
- Hicks, Alexander: Social Democratic Corporatism and Economic Growth, in: *Journal of Politics* 50, 1988, S. 677-704.
- Kirchner, Emil J./Konrad Schwaiger: *The role of interest groups in the European Community*, Aldershot: Gower 1981.
- Kirchner, Emil J./Konrad Schwaiger: *The role of interest groups in the European Community*, Aldershot: Gower 1981.
- Kirchner, Emil Josef: *Trade unions as a pressure group in the European Community*, Westmead: Saxon House 1978.
- Kirchner, Emil/Konrad Schwaiger: *The role of interest groups in the European Community*, Hampshire: Gower 1981.
- Kohler-Koch, Beate (1995), *The Strength of Weakness*, Working Paper AB III/10, MZES, Mannheim.
- Kohler-Koch, Beate (1996), *Die Gestaltungsmacht organisierter Interessen*, in: Markus Jachtenfuchs, Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), *Europäische Integration*, Opladen: Leske + Budrich 193-222.
- Lange, Peter/Geoffrey Garrett: *The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980*, in: *Journal of Politics* 47, 1985, S. 792-827.
- Lange, Peter/Hudson Meadwell: *Typologies of Democratic Systems: From Political Inputs to Political Economy*, in: Howard J. Wiarda (Hrsg.), *New*

- Directions in Comparative Politics, Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press 1991, S. 82-117.
- Lehmbruch, Gerhard (1982), Neo-Corporatism and the Function of Representative Institutions, prepared for presentation at the conference „Representation and the State“, Stanford University, Oct. 11-15.
- Lehmbruch, Gerhard (1982): Neo-corporatism in comparative perspective, in: Gerhard Lehmbruch/Phillipe C. Schmitter (Hrsg.), Patterns of corporatist policy-making, London/Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 1-28.
- Lehmbruch, Gerhard/Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.)(1982): Patterns of corporatist policy-making, London/Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin/Stein Rokkan (1967): Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments. An introduction, in: Seymour Martin Lipset/Stein Rokkan (Hrsg.), Party systems and voter alignments, New York: Free Press, S. 1-64.
- Marks, Gary: Neocorporatism and Incomes Policy in Western Europe and North America, in: Comparative Politics 18, 1986, S. 253-277.
- Offe, Claus: The attribution of public status to interest groups: Observations on the West German case, in: Suzanne Berger (Hrsg.), Organizing interests in Western Europe, Cambridge u.a.: Cambridge University Press 1981, S. 123-158.
- Pappi, Franz Urban/Willi Schnorpfel (1996): Das Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Kommission, in: Thomas König, Elmar Rieger, Hermann Schmitt (eds.), Das europäische Mehrebenensystem, Frankfurt: Campus, pp.135-159.
- Rokkan, Stein (1966), Norway. Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism, in: Robert A. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 70-115.
- Schendelen, Rinus van (1991): Images of Democratic Representation in the European Community, in: Hans-Dieter Klingemann/Richard Stöss/Bernhard Weßels (eds.), Politische Klasse und politische Institutionen, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, S. 357-371.
- Schmid, Josef (1996), Wohlfahrtsverbände in modernen Wohlfahrtsstaaten, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Schmitter, Philippe C./Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.)(1979): Trends toward corporatist intermediation, Beverly Hills/London: Sage.

- Streeck, Wolfgang (1996), Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?, in: Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Phillippe C. Schmitter, Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), *Governance in the European Union*, London: Sage.
- Truman, David B. (1971), *The Governmental Process*, New York: Knopf 1951.
- Visser, Jelle (1990): In search of inclusive unionism, in: *Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations*, Nr. 18, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers.
- Visser, Jelle/Bernhard Ebbinghaus (1992), Making the Most of Diversity? in: Justin Greenwood, Jürgen R. Grote, Karsten Ronit (eds.), *Organized Interests and the European Community*, London: Sage: 206-237.
- Wallerstein Michael: Centralized bargaining and wage restraint, in: *American Journal of Political Science* 34, 1990, S. 982-1004.
- Wessels, Bernhard (1996): Systems of Economic Interest Groups and Socio-Economic Performance, Paper prepared for delivery at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The San Francisco Hilton and Towers, August 29-September 1, 1996; Division 25 „Comparative Politics of Advanced Industrial States“, Panel 25-12 „Liberalization and National Organizational Responsiveness“.
- Wessels, Bernhard (1997), Organizing Capacity of Societies and Modernity, in: Jan W. van Deth (eds.), *Private Groups and Public Life*, London: Routledge (ECPR-Publications), forthcoming.
- Wessels, Bernhard/Achim Kielhorn/Jacques Thomassen (1997), *Political Representation in Europe: European Members of Parliament Study, Codebook of the Integrated Dataset of Members of European Parliament and Members of National Parliaments*, Berlin.
- Wilson, Graham K. (1990): *Interest groups*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.