

**Different Parliaments - Different Recruitment
Patterns?
Candidates and the Elected for the National and the
European Parliament in Germany**

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Prepared for presentation at the 1995 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR, Workshop on "Legislative Recruitment and the Structure of Opportunities", Bordeaux, 27 April - 2 May 1995

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1. Introduction

Recruitment is one of the main functions of every political system. It is one of the four central input functions (Almond, Coleman 1960:47). The result of recruitment is what in most western democracies is called the political elite. "*Legislative* recruitment refers specifically to the critical step as individuals move from lower levels into parliamentary careers" (Norris, Lovenduski 1995:1). It refers to the mechanisms and processes that select from millions of politically motivated citizens those several thousand who reach positions in parliaments, either on the land (state) level, federal or European level (Putnam 1976:46).

This paper is an attempt to analyse recruitment patterns of German candidates for two types of parliament: the national one (*German Bundestag*) and the supra-national European Parliament. Its main goal is the comparison of similarities and differences on the route to both parliaments. European elections have been regarded as "second-order elections" for quite a while (Reif 1978; Reiff and Schmitt 1980). This term reflects the attitude of larger parts of the electorate that the European institutions and the European political system is quite distant from day-to-day life and European unification constitutes a remote issue. European elections often have served as a means of protest giving the electorate the opportunity to vote in the national context without affecting the national context itself. This is one of the explanations why extremist and outsider parties have been more successful in the European than in the German context. The question is, however, whether this view of the European Parliament being a political institution of second-order relevance holds also true when it comes to recruitment of candidates. The fact that some of the MEPs only regard their European involvement as a springboard for a national career (Herman and Lodge 1979:144), points into this direction. The same is true for the argument of some students of European politics who at least implicitly see one of the reasons for the deficits of European politics in the quality of the candidates and MEPs. Most often, this argument is positively formulated. Holland (1993:147) for example states, that "to "enhance the calibre of the candidates" would help the quality of the European democratic process.

If European politics are indeed regarded as second-order compared to national politics by the national political parties, which are the major selectors of candidates, this should show up in different recruitment patterns between candidates for the national and the European Parliament. Constraints on national candidacy and the placement on promising positions on the party lists should be much narrower than for candidacy for the European Parliament.

If, on the other hand, recruitment patterns show the same general pattern on both parliamentary levels, that would leave us with the puzzle that the second-order hypothesis proves to be wrong on the level of *selectors* but not on the level of *electors*.

The paper is organized in 4 sections. First, the structure of candidate competition is compared giving some insight in the demand-and-supply problem; second, the socio-demographic structure of candidates on both levels for the 1994 elections is described; third, the distribution of electoral prospects along socio-demographic factors is analysed, fourth, candidates and elected are compared with respect to socio-demographic factors and career patterns. The paper serves mainly a descriptive purpose but applies where possible some steps into the direction of causal explanation. It utilizes data for candidates and elected from the Federal Statistical Office and surveys results from the German EP-Candidate Survey 1994 and from the German Representation Study 1988/89 (see appendix).

2. The Structure of Candidate Competition on the National and the European Level

The structure of electoral competition for the federal and European elections differs somewhat with respect to electoral law. On the federal level the voters cast two ballots simultaneously, one for a candidate to be chosen by the plurality in single member districts, and the other for a party list to be awarded seats by proportional representation in a state-wide multi-member district. "Each party then gets its plurality-won seats plus the number of seats won by the proportional rule less the number of plurality-won seats" (Riker 1986:37). In the European elections only one vote is cast and only on party lists which can take two forms: either a nation-wide list which is preferred by most parties or by state-wide lists. For both types of elections there is a nation-wide five-percent threshold, i.e., the percentage of votes a party receives in the party list vote determines the final allocation of parliamentary seats. This difference in electoral law provides different opportunity structures for candidates, given the possibility of running as a double candidate in the federal but not in the European elections. It is also evident that this affects recruitment, but

not with respect to criteria of selection but with respect to the selectors: the selection of candidates for the single-member districts is mainly in the hands of the local party organizations and national or state party leadership has relatively little influence whereas the opposite is true for the party lists which are proposed by the party leaders but have to be accepted by the local or regional party delegates" (Ellwein 1973:208).

Although the selectors differ with respect to candidates for single-member districts and for party lists, the criteria for selection are quite similar. Since the criteria of selection of candidates for the federal elections are quite similar in general, regardless the type of candidacy, the difference in electoral procedures does not have too many implications for the comparison of candidates on the federal and the European level.

But the comparison of the mere numbers of candidates and available seats shows quite a difference in the chances of candidates for the national and the European Parliament (see table 1). Although the number of candidates for the German Bundestag is about three times as large as for the European Parliament, it is obvious that the chances for the latter are much smaller, given the number of seats available in both parliaments. 17 to 19 percent of all national candidates get a seat whereas just half this percentage holds true for European candidates. Thus the chance to win a mandate for the German Bundestag is twice as high as for the European Parliament. A comparison of figures of the German Bundestag with those of other Western parliamentary democracies shows that Germany ranks in a middle position of countries with about 17-19 per cent chance. Compared with Iceland, Sweden, Israel or Italy, where only a maximum number of about 7 per cent of the candidates can become elected the chances are extraordinary. Compared to Japan and the USA, however, with a chance higher than 50 per cent, chances in Germany are low (see comparative figures in: Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 191). But chances of the German candidates for European parliament are almost as low as for Iceland, Sweden, Israel or Italy (table 1).

These figures indicate either that selectors are more rigid concerning candidates for the federal level (*demand* side) or that the number of candidates for the federal level has exceeded the *supply* of people being willing to run for a mandate (Norris and Lovenduski 1995:14f and chapter 6). The latter interpretation is supported by the fact that for the European level many more candidates run relatively to the total number of possible mandates than on the federal level. This view holds also true comparing the portion of candidates running for parties being in parliament in the previous period (parliamentary parties). Given the fact that smaller and extremist parties have more success in the European than in the federal elections one would expect relatively more candidates of non-parliamentary parties for the European than for the federal level. But this is not the case. The portion of candidates not running for a parliamentary party in 1994 was 48 percent for the European and 45 for the federal parliament.

Table 1: Candidate Competition for the European Parliament and the National Parliament in Germany

	Federal Elections								EP-Elections			
	1987				1994				1994			
	Cand.	MP's	Cand. per MP	% elected	Cand.	MP's	Cand. per MP	% elected	Cand.	MEP's	Cand. per MEP	% elected
<u>Total</u>	2690	519	5.18	19.3	3931	672	5.84	17.1	1171	99	11.83	8.5
<u>Major parties:</u>												
CDU/CSU	516	234	2.21	45.4	580	294	1.97	50.7	220	47	4.68	21.4
SPD	473	193	2.45	40.8	532	252	2.11	47.4	160	40	4.00	25.0
FDP	321	48	6.69	15.0	378	47	8.04	12.4	189	0	∞	0.0
Greens	285	44	6.48	15.4	367	49	7.49	13.4	22	12	1.83	54.6
PDS	--	--	--	--	269	30	8.97	11.2	18	0	∞	0.0

(compare Norris/Lovenduski, p. 191)

In general the likelihood for a mandate is much higher for candidates of parliamentary parties. On average the chances on the European level are still half of those on the federal level. Looking at particular parties this holds true for the large parties, i.e. CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) and the SPD (Social Democrats) but not for the smaller parties. Here the figures turn. Chances are much higher for a European than a federal mandate (54.6 per cent for the Greens) (table 1).

Summing up, the figures on candidate competition at a first glance might lead to the impression that selectors are more rigid on the federal than on the European level. But inspecting the data a little bit closer, it could be as well that not demand factors but supply factors lead to the situation that the rate of candidate competition for the European Parliament is much higher than for the federal parliament. No pre-conclusion can be drawn from the structure of candidate competition with respect to differences in recruitment patterns and selection processes.

3. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Candidates Compared

Socio-demographic characteristics matter for recruitment. This is a commonly shared view and more than obvious looking at parliaments in modern democracies. But a common view why they matter cannot be found so easily. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) distinguish demand and supply explanations. More or less all explanations of recruitment processes relate to one of the two categories and the two give very different explanations why socio-demographics matter.

With respect to gender a demand explanation has as a starting point explicit or implicit the assumption of a discriminating standpoint of the selectors (Beyme 1974:23f, Norris and Lovenduski 1995:115). A supply explanation would be that the different gender roles in particular in the family make women less available for politics. For a comparison of the recruitment of candidates for the two parliaments this would have different consequences with respect of the hypothesis of a second-order relevance of the European Parliament. If the European is really a second-order parliament, this would show up only in a demand explanation. Then women should be better represented in the group of candidates for the European Parliament. If recruitment is restricted by the supply-side, this would be true for both elections in the same way. Looking at the portion of women (table 2), no significant difference appears between the two candidatures (and if regarded as significant it is opposite to what is expected from a demand explanation). Thus, if a demand explanation is correct, no indication can be found that selectors are more restrictive for the federal elections.

The same is true looking at the mean age of the candidates. Age is of relevance for recruitment because recruitment processes are almost always based on more or less long-lasting political careers (Herzog 1975). Only after what is called a "Ochsentour" in a political party, i.e. taking responsibility for less attractive service positions in the party for longer periods and climbing the ladder in a toilsome way, one is rewarded by becoming a candidate for a more attractive office. Thus, candidates for parliament cannot be too young. This is exactly what shows up in the data. The mean age is about 45. And again, no significant difference can be observed between candidates for the German Bundestag and the European Parliament (table 2). Looking at the mean age in gender groups, no significant difference appears. Again, no indication can be found for a demand model based hypothesis of the European Parliament being of second-order relevance.

Looking at the most important complex of socio-demographic factors, i.e. occupation or profession, some differences can be detected. Occupation or profession is the most important factor in both general models of explanation. In the demand explanation occupation is important because it is related to different skills. In the supply explanation it is important because different occupations show different resources for an engagement in politics (i.e. flexibility in time, job security etc.). Occupations/professions are only classified roughly in 22 categories (see list in the appendix). About 30 per cent of the candidates can be found in three of these 22 categories (table 2). These are administrators/politicians, white collar employees, and educational professionals in both groups. But the size of the groups differs between the federal and the European level in particular with respect to administrators/politicians. This group is significantly larger among candidates for national parliament. There is only little doubt that this difference only reflects the different structure of candidate competition. Given the fact that in principle about 17 per cent of the federal candidates can be office holders in the German Bundestag whereas the same is true for less than half of the European candidates, the difference found is surprisingly low. Again, no indication can be found for different selection criteria on both levels.

Table 2: Characteristics of Candidates for the National and European Parliament, Germany 1994

	National Parliament	European Parliament
Candidate Type		
- District only	21.8 %	-
- Party list, land level	41.4 %	19.1 % **
- Party list, federal level	-	80.9 %
- District and list	36.8 %	-
Party		
- Parliamentary Party *	54.1 %	55.9 %
- Others	45.9 %	45.6 %
Gender		
- Women	29.4 %	28.2 %
- Men	70.6 %	71.8 %
Mean Age		
- Women	45.2	45.1
- Men	45.3	45.5
Largest professional categories		
a) Administrators/Politicians	11.7 %	7.9 %
b) White collar employees	10.5 %	10.8 %
c) Educational professionals	11.2 %	12.8 %
a) - women	9.9 %	6.4 %
- men	12.5 %	8.4 %
b) - women	14.5 %	13.9 %
- men	8.8 %	9.6 %
c) - women	13.1 %	13.6 %
- men	10.3 %	12.5 %
<hr/>		
Candidates total:	3931	1171

* in Parliament in previous period; NP: Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), Social Democrats (SPD), Liberals (FDP), Greens/ B 90, Socialist Party (PDS); EP: Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens and Republikaner (right wing).

** 224 candidates; 190 CDU, 30 CSU, 4 other parties.

Sources: German Bundestag Candidate Data 1994, German EP-Candidate Data 1994.

However, it is interesting to consider the structure of gender differences in occupation, which is more or less the same for both types of candidates. A relatively high number of women are white collar employees or educational professionals whereas a relatively high number of men come from occupations very close to politics (administrators, politicians) (table 2).

Summing up the results from an investigation of very general socio-demographic characteristics no indication can be found that selection processes differ between the national and the European Parliament in Germany.

4. Electoral Prospects and Socio-Demographic Characteristics

A comparison of the characteristics of the universe of candidates for the two parliaments shows that they do not differ in general. It does, however, tell us only something about the collectivities as a whole but not about their internal stratification with respect to electoral prospects. And, evidently, it tells us nothing whether particular characteristics are of importance for recruiting candidates into groups of different electoral prospects. The structure of electoral prospects can be conceptualized as a pyramid with almost no chance to become elected at the bottom and with high chances to become elected at the top. On average 80 per cent of the candidates or even more have no realistic chance to become elected. Since the number of candidates exceeds the number of seats by far, there is the necessity as well as the possibility for selection processes, to choose on the basis of some criteria and to give some candidates a big, others some and the majority no chance.

The question is, however, which criteria are concerned with respect to socio-demographic factors and whether there is a difference between candidates for the national and the European Parliament. For this reason, candidates are classified according to their electoral prospects into three groups: those with no or most likely no chance for a seat, those with some chance and those with a big chance. Since in Germany party affiliation rules out the character of a candidate as a criteria for the voting decision in general, one can apply the distinction of electoral chances to district candidates as well. With respect to parties districts can be distinguished into strongholds (more than 60 per cent for the candidate since 1983), secure districts (more than 50 per cent of the vote since 1983) and not secure districts (all others) of a party. For party list candidates, a different algorithm was used. The number of seats won in the previous elections (1990, 1989 respectively) were taken as an indication of the actual chances for the party. All candidates who took a list position smaller or equal to the number of seats won were classified of having big

chances, all those whose placement exceeded twice the number of mandates won, classified of having no chances. All others, i.e. on list positions greater than the number of seats but smaller or equal to twice the number of seats, have been classified of having some chance. This calculation was done on the basis of Länder (state) lists for the federal elections and also for the CDU/CSU and for candidates of other parties for the European elections. All other parties in the European elections had a nation-wide list.

According to this classification 9.8 per cent of the candidates in the federal elections and 7.9 per cent in the European election had a big chance, about 8.0 per cent some chance in both cases and more than 80 per cent almost no chance. The classification shows some validity looking at the positions being elected: about 90 per cent of those with big chances were elected, 39 per cent of those with some chances on the federal, 26 per cent on the European level. 6 and 1 per cent of those with almost no chance were elected respectively (table 3).

Table 3: Electoral Prospects and Electoral Success

	National Parliament % Elected	European Parliament % Elected
No chance	6.2	1.3
Some chance	39.0	26.3
Big chance	90.6	87.2

There are clear differences between these three groups of candidates. Candidates with big chances are on average five years older than the vast majority of candidates. This is true for both parliaments. However, it is interesting that women with big chances are on average younger than men and that the difference in age between women with almost no and big chances is smaller than between men's groups. One cannot apply a general rule with respect to gender. The group of women with big chances is relatively a bit smaller than of men for the German Bundestag, but significantly relatively greater on the European level (table 4).

Occupation clearly makes a difference for electoral prospects, too. On both levels, a third or even higher percentage of candidates being administrators/politicians have big chances to become elected. Media professionals, lawyers/judges and technical professionals have also very good chances. The opposite occupational groups, i.e. those where almost no candidate had a big chance, are the agricultural professionals (no farmers), the employees

in the cultural sector, technicians and the not working, i. e. housewives or the retired (table 4).

Table 4: Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Prospects. Germany 1994

	NP *			EP **		
	no	Chances some	big	no	Chances some	big
Women	81.9 %	8.8 %	9.3 %	80.2 %	9.9 %	9.9 %
Men	82.4 %	7.6 %	10.0 %	86.0 %	6.9 %	7.1 %
Mean Age	44.6	46.0	50.0	45.1	44.5	50.1
- Women	45.0	44.6	47.9	45.5	46.1	49.4
- Men	44.4	46.7	50.9	44.9	43.6	50.5
Occupation						
a) Chance above average (first 3)						
- Administrators/ Politicians	43.6 %	14.1 %	42.3 %	50.6 %	16.9 %	32.5 %
- Media Professionals	81.5 %	6.5 %	12.0 %	61.5 %	19.2 %	19.2 %
- Techn. Professionals	85.0 %	7.9 %	7.0 %	82.3 %	3.2 %	14.5 %
- Lawyers/Judges	65.5 %	17.5 %	17.0 %	73.2 %	15.5 %	11.3 %
b) Lowest chances (last 3)						
- Agric. Professionals	96.2 %	0.0 %	3.8 %	100.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %
- Not working (retired. housewife)	93.4 %	4.4 %	2.2 %	98.2 %	1.8 %	0.0 %
- Employees in cultural sector	97.7 %	2.3 %	0.0 %	100.0 %	6.0 %	0.0 %
- Technicians	95.5 %	3.4 %	1.1 %	94.4 %	5.6 %	0.0 %
Average	82.2 %	8.0 %	9.8 %	84.4 %	7.7 %	7.9 %

* Calculated from 1990 number of seats per party on party lists in Länder (List position = < seats = big chance; list position > seats * 2 = no chance; in between: some chance) and on district strongholds 1983 - 1990 (see text).

** Calculated from 1989 number of seats per party. List position = < seats = big chance; list position > seats * 2 = no chance; in between: some chance. "Ersatzbewerber" excluded (N = 183).

Sources: German Bundestag Candidate Data 1994, German EP-Candidate Data 1994.

Comparing the characteristics which make a difference for the electoral prospects on the national and European level, the structure is very similar again. With respect to occupation, the rank-order of the most privileged and most disadvantaged is almost the same. But with respect to the chances of different occupation groups there are also some differences. Administrators/politicians have relatively better chances on the national than on the European level. The portion of those with big chances to become elected is about 10 percentage points higher on the national level. Media professionals are in a better position in European elections as well as technical professionals, whereas lawyers/judges are more privileged on the national than on the federal level. Since these differences only exist with respect to the advantaged but not with respect to the disadvantaged occupational groups, it is quite likely that different functional demands in both parliaments are responsible for these differences.

Whereas in the national context it is a resource being an administrator or a lawmen in the sense that it means to have a generalized competence in how the nation state is governed, the same does not apply to the European level. Specialised qualification in German law and administration probably does not contribute too much to problem solving on the European level. At least it is plausible to assume that substantial knowledge in policy areas is of more use on the European level than the substantial knowledge in German law and administration. However, this is pure speculation and without some more validation it only can be regarded as a working hypothesis.

Thus the results from comparing the electoral prospects with respect to socio-demographic characteristics can be interpreted in two ways: According to an assumption of functional different demands in both parliaments, differences in selection of candidates with respect to occupation indicate just functional differences of the two parliaments. Thus there are different opportunity structures for professions with respect to the two parliaments, but these are not hierarchical but horizontal differences. The basic condition is to be a professional of what kind ever. A second interpretation would be, to assume a *political* hierarchy of the professions. There is no doubt that such a hierarchy exists on the national level: professionals of law are at the top, often coming from the civil service, followed by (higher) administrators, representatives of interest organisations and self-employed professionals. Being this the case in principle for the European level, too, the differences would indicate, that "professionalization" is not as strong on the European level as on the national level. But the question for differences in professionalization is much more complex than assuming a political hierarchy of professions according to their potential for qualification for politics (Herzog 1975:181ff.). And it is at the heart for an answer to the question whether European Parliament recruitment is as second-order as the European elections. It poses the question for political experience and political careers.

5. Candidates, Elected and Political Professionalization

"If we wish to face facts squarely, we must recognize that, in modern democracies of any type other than the Swiss, politics will unavoidably be a career" wrote Schumpeter 1942 (Schumpeter 1962:285). In 1921 Max Weber argued for politics as a profession (Weber 1958). In the late sixties, Kogon, an important thinker in Germany, made a proposal for a national foundation for the education of the coming generation of parliamentarians (Herzog 1971:184). The more it needs a career to become a successful politician the more politics become a profession. The major agencies, making politics a profession are political parties, at least in Germany. In the political organization skills are developed by participation. The more particular skills prove to be relevant for politics which cannot be learned anywhere but in political parties, the more important parties become. The more those skills are regarded as important, the more they count for selection processes and individual political careers. The cross-over from professions outside politics to higher political offices become more and more seldom (Wessels 1987). The political career, the toilsome climbing of the ladder ("Ochsentour") becomes more and more important.

To a certain extent the family background plays a role regarding the motivation to engage in politics. But motivation alone is not enough. An essential help for a political career of which one cannot make a living for a long time is an occupation that guarantees the most flexible availability. Max Weber called it "Abkömmlichkeit" and regarded journalists, party officials and lawyers as the most privileged with respect to flexible availability in his time. These two factors can be regarded as influential factors for the likelihood of starting a career.

The career itself starts with the entry into a party, not only as a pocketbook member but as an active member. All kinds of smaller duties and unattractive tasks during party meetings are probably the starting point of most political careers. The next period of a career are party offices on the lower levels of the organisation and after that the first political offices follow. This is the typical way political careers work in Germany, be it a political career of a business man, a manager, a journalist, a worker or a civil servant (Herzog 1975: ch. VI).

Thus socialisation factors might initiate whereas occupation might facilitate a political career. The position of an individual in his or her political career is indicated in a hierarchical sense by the duration of party membership, holding local party office, local elected office, being a candidate for higher office, being a holder of higher office and being a member of the national party office.

All these factors influence the selection of candidates very much. But they are even more important for being selected as candidate with big chances to become elected, i.e with a good list position or in a good district.

For a lack of data candidates and elected for the European Parliament can only be compared here. There are no political career data available for candidates to the German Bundestag but for the members of the German Bundestag. Thus, only two comparisons are possible here with respect to socialisation factors and political careers: candidates and elected on the European level, and elected on the national and European level.

Concerning the career-facilitating factor occupation, four groups show a proportion of elected more than average (17.1%) on the national level: administrators/politicians, lawyers/judges, farmer/fishermen and media professionals. The proportion of elected among the administrators/politicians (68.1%) is outstanding. On the European level, five groups show higher proportions of elected than average: the four mentioned for the national level and technical professionals. It is interesting, however, that the relative chances of administrators/politicians are much lower (35.9%) compared to the national group and that the rank-order with respect to proportions being elected differs (table 5).

Table 5: Professional/Occupational Groups with Electoral Chances higher than average. Germany 1994

	National Parliament		European Parliament	
	Elected	% of Elected	Elected	% of Elected
Administrators/Politicians	68.1 %	46.7	35.9 %	33.3
Lawyers/Judges	34.5 %	8.8	13.0 %	10.1
Farmers/Fishermen	24.7 %	2.7	14.8 %	4.0
Media Professionals	19.6 %	2.7	23.3 %	7.1
Techn. Professionals			17.9 %	12.1
Average		19.3		8.5

Sources: German Bundestag Candidate Data 1994, German EP-Candidate Data 1994

With respect to the socialisation and political career factors it is obvious that in most families mother or father have not been elected office holders of any kind. But it is also obvious that the group coming from "political families" is much larger among the elected than the unsuccessful candidates (table 6).

Table 6: Career Variables of Candidates and Elected to the German Bundestag and the European Parliament

	National Parliament MP's	European Parliament Elected	European Parliament Candidates
<i>Political Family Background</i>			
Office Holder			
- Mother	2.6 %	3.2 %	0.0 %
- Father	13.8 %	9.7 %	1.4 %
<i>Career Characteristics</i>			
Party membership more than 10 years	94.7 %	81.2 %	36.1 %
Local Party Office	76.9 %	93.5 %	68.0 %
Elected Local Office	67.7 %	48.4 %	30.0 %
Candidate Before	-	50.0 %	16.8 %
Office Holder*	82.3 %	53.1 %	1.1 %
National Party Office**	13.3 %	12.9 %	0.5 %
Number of Cases	195	33	362

* Source for the German Bundestag: Schindler (1994:239)

** here only candidates of parliamentary parties are considered. Taking candidates of all parties into account, the proportion would be for the unsuccessful candidates to the European Parliament 14.9%. This is due to the fact that many small parties' organization running for office is more or less the national party office only. There is no real organization in the background.

Sources: German Representation Study 1988/89; German EP-Candidate Survey 1994

Among the elected the group of those joining the party for more than 10 years is also much larger. It is more than 80 per cent of the MEPs and below 40 per cent of the candidates. Of the elected also more hold or held local party offices and elected local office. Half of the European elected candidates were candidates before, whereas this is true for only 16.8 per cent of the non-elected. The difference is even larger with respect to office holding in the

previous period (53.1% to 1.1%). Being a member of the national party office in a parliamentary party seems to widely guarantee a good position on the list. Only 12.9 per cent of the elected hold or held national party office compared to a half per cent of the non-elected. But members of national party office of a parliamentary parties have all been elected except one from the Green party. Being a member of the national party office is most closely related to electoral success (table 6).

Comparing the elected of the national and the European parliament, it is obvious that the general pattern of recruitment and selection is quite the same. But there are differences which cannot be neglected. In socialisation factors the correspondence is very high. A small though much larger portion than average of the elected of both parliaments come from "political" families. But more members of the German Bundestag are more than ten years members of their party and hold or held elected local office. This could be an indication that career paths to the national parliament are more restricted than to the European Parliament.

This interpretation is supported by socio-demographic factors like gender, age, and occupation which can be compared for candidates as well as elected to both parliaments. Being a lawyer or judge and most important being an administrator or politician show stronger effects on electoral success on the national than on the European level (table 7b). Regression analysis shows that these variables explain a much higher portion of electoral success on the national than on the European level. Again, this is an indication of higher constraints on the national level. Also, the much smaller effects of the single variables could indicate that selection processes for the European Parliament seem to be not as restrictive than on the national level.

Table 7a: Regression of Demographic Characteristics on Electoral Prospects of Candidates, 1994

	German Bundestag		European Parliament	
	beta	Sig. T	beta	Sig. T
Gender (women)	.02	.17	.06	.03
Age	.09	.00	.06	.06
Mediaprofessional	.03	.04	.11	.00
Lawyer/Judge	.12	.00	.10	.00
Administrator/Politician	.41	.00	.30	.00
Adj. R ²	.19		.11	
Number of Cases	3931		1171	

Electoral Prospects: 0 very low; 1 some chance, 2 very high.

Table 7b: Regression of Demographic Characteristics on Electoral Success of Candidates, 1994

	German Bundestag		European Parliament	
	beta	Sig. T	beta	Sig. T
Gender (women)	-.01	.74	.04	.11
Age	.10	.00	.06	.03
Mediaprofessional	.04	.01	.10	.00
Lawyer/Judge	.14	.00	.07	.01
Administrator/Politician	.49	.00	.29	.00
Adj. R ²	.27		.10	
Number of Cases	3931		1171	

Electoral Success: being elected.

6. Summary

This paper started from the observation of students that European elections are considered as "second-order" compared to national ones. It posed the question whether this holds true not only for *election* but also for *selection*.

Candidate competition in the European elections is much higher than on the national level. This could give the impression of a more rigid selection of candidates. But it could also be that the supply of candidates for the German Bundestag has reached its top with almost 4000 people running for a mandate. Socio-demographic characteristics of the candidates are very similar. Differences between the national and European level appear when investigating the characteristics of candidates with high electoral prospects with respect to the role of occupations and professions. Whereas on the national level professions with a deep knowledge of German law and administration have better chances this also applies to media professionals and technical professionals on the European level. This can be a result of different functional demands in the two parliaments. It can also be an indication for less restrictive career patterns on the European level, i.e. a lower professionalization. The latter view is supported by the fact that careers seem to be more restricted on the national level as some indicators for political career show. It is also supported by the fact, that selection can be better "explained" in statistical terms by demographic and in particular by occupational factors on the national level, indicating that careers are more restricted.

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Appendix

A1. Data Sources

German Representation Study 1988/89: 329 face-to-face interviews with MPs (response rate 62 per cent); principal investigators: Dietrich Herzog, Free University of Berlin and Bernhard Wessels, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

German EP-Candidate Survey 1994: mail questionnaire, 395 respondents (33 per cent response rate); principal investigator: Bernhard Wessels, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

German Bundestag Candidate Data 1994: Dataset on the basis of information from the Federal Statistical Office on 3931 candidates; compiled by Achim Kielhorn and Bernhard Wessels, both Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

German EP-Candidate Data 1994: Dataset on the basis of information from the Federal Statistical Office on 1171 candidates; compiled by Bernhard Wessels, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

A2. 22 Occupational/Professional Categories Coded

Farmers/Fishermen
Agricultural Professionals
Workers/Handicrafts
Technical Professionals
Technicians
Trade (white collar)
Banking/Insurance
Managers/Employers
Administrators/Politicians
Financial Controllers
White Collar Workers
Army/Police
Lawyers/Judges
Media Professionals
Cultural Sector (artists etc.)
Medical Doctors
Medical/Social Services
Educational Professionals
Economic Professionals
Miscellaneous
Students/in Education
Not Working/Retired/Housewives